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Where Copyright Meets Privacy in the
Big Data Era: Access to and Control
Over User Data in Agriculture and the
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Tesh W. Dagne*
ABSTRACT
The application of big data in different sectors of the economy
and its transformative value has recently attracted considerable
attention. However, this transformation, driven by the application of
advanced technologies that utilize big data—such as the Internet of
Things (IoT), artificial intelligence (AI), and software systems—raises
concerns about access to and control over the user data that results from
the uptake in using digital technologies. This Article examines the role
different legal regimes have in framing access to and control over various
forms of user data from the perspective of technology users in the
agriculture sector. This Article then goes on to inquire whether copyright
law in unpublished works can serve as a model for a new form of data
regulation that shifts ownership claims towards ensuring access and
controlling disclosure.
The current regime regulating access to and controlling user data
is the Fair Information Practices model, implemented primarily through
private ordering in contractual arrangement—specifically agreements
establishing the relationship between users and technology providers,
data intermediaries, and data platforms. This Article seeks to provide a
framework that recognizes and protects data originators’ privacy and
economic interests in user data by proposing a trust model of data
*
LL. B, LL.M, JSD, Associate Professor, Thompson Rivers University Faculty of Law,
Canada. The author would like to thank Professor Margaret Chon and Professor Chidi Oguamanam for their insightful feedback. Early draft of the Article was presented at the 2021 IP Scholars
Conference, the 2021 Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) Conference, and the
2021 M3 Intellectual Property Scholars Workshop. The author appreciates the feedback and suggestions received from participants in these forums. In addition, the author acknowledges feedback
from the editorial team of the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law. All errors
remain those of the author.

675

676

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:4:675

sharing. It does so by studying the normative roots underpinning
copyright protection of unpublished works under the doctrine of joint
authorship in copyright law. Based on these normative roots, this Article
argues that a sui generis legislative framework can be enacted at the
federal level, both in Canada and the United States, in order to cater to
the interests of technology users regarding data they originate,
particularly in terms of activity data, such as farm-operation data and
technical data in the form of agronomy data. The Article identifies rights
to control disclosure and access data as two minimum rights, which new
legislation ought to recognize as flowing from users’ authorship of data
and their categorization as users of works under copyright.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of “big data” and its accompanying
“datafication” have become significant trends in everyday life.1 With the
application of advanced technologies and the connections that these
technologies demonstrate in their deployment on different spheres, new
issues in areas of law governing user data have been brought to the
forefront of several types of law: copyright law,2 data privacy protection
law,3 and contract law concerning access to and control over data.4
This Article examines the intersection between copyright law
and privacy law in the utilization of user data.5 After demonstrating the
inadequacy of protection of the rights and interests of technology users
under the current fragmented and unclear legal regimes that address
1.

See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6 (2013). The term “datafication” is
commonly used to refer to the transformation of information or knowledge about people into a
commodity, whereas “big data” describes the practice of drawing new and valuable insights from
large datasets to extract value. Id. at 6, 15.
2.
See Sylvia Zhang, Who Owns the Data Generated by Your Smart Car? 32 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 299, 305–09 (2018); Shannon L. Ferrell, Legal Issues on the Farm Data Frontier, Part
I: Managing First-Degree Relationships in Farm Data Transfers, 21 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 13, 29–31
(2016).
3.
See generally Jacob Strobel, Agriculture Precision Farming: Who Owns the Property of
Information? Is it the Farmer, the Company Who Helps Consult the Farmer on How to Use
Information the Best, or the Mechanical Company Who Built the Technology Itself? 19 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 239 (2014) (discussing data privacy issues in agriculture); Michael E. Sykuta, Big Data
in Agriculture: Property Rights, Privacy and Competition in Ag Data Services, 19 INT’L FOOD &
AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 57 (2016) (discussing privacy, ownership, and use of farm data).
4.
See generally Simone van der Burg, Leanne Wiseman & Jovana Krkeljas, Trust in
Farm Data Sharing: Reflections on the EU Code of Conduct for Agricultural Data Sharing, 23
ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 185 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09543-1 (last visited May 24,
2021) (discussing how the European Union encourages transparency in using agricultural data via
contracts); Ashley Ellixson, Terry W. Griffin, Shannon Ferrell & Paul Goeringer, Legal and
Economic Implications of Farm Data: Ownership and Possible Protections, 24 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
49 (2019) (discussing how farm data may be protectable as a trade secret). Though of limited
significance, user data can also be controlled through trade secret law (referred to as confidential
information law in Canada). See Brian Leopold, Forecasting Change: Examining the Future of Agricultural Data Processors and Ownership Rights, 44 J. CORP. L. 403, 415–16 (2018–2019).
5.
The term “privacy” is subject to multiple definitions. In its traditional legal definition,
privacy’s contours range from the right to be left alone, to the right to be free from unreasonable
government searches and seizures, the right to have one’s home free from certain trespasses and
surveillance, and the right to make certain essential human decisions without government
interference. See Privacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). This Article is concerned with
legal entitlements to information that bring only one type of privacy concern: control over technology user data. See discussion infra accompanying note 174. “User data” is defined in this Article
broadly as encompassing different categories of data that arise from technology users’ activities in
diverse spheres, such as agriculture, health, education, etc. See discussion infra
Section II.B. Also, the term “user” in this article should be distinguished from its use in copyright
scholarship as juxtaposed to “owner” of copyright.
THAT
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accessibility, availability, and control over data, this Article proposes a
data governance approach of regulating user data under a sui generis
regime, modeled on copyright. Under this model, the law recognizes
technology users as stakeholders in data. As such, they are protected
against
exploitative,
contract-based
arrangements
through
entitlements that allow users to exercise more robust control over the
use of their data. The doctrinal foundations of joint authorship in
copyright, which recognize the contribution of collaborators,6 justify
protecting the data originator’s privacy and economic interests in user
data. The model also has a normative basis in authors’ copyright claims
for the unauthorized, public dissemination of private, unpublished
works that are revelatory of an author’s identity.
The question of access to and control over data in the big data
era, as discussed in this Article, arises with respect to all types and
categories of technology user data. This Article, however, will focus
specifically on agricultural data because in most jurisdictions, including
Canada and the United States, there is no legal regime dedicated to
regulating access to or control over agricultural data, unlike other
categories of data such as financial or health.7 Moreover, a focus on
agriculture highlights the broad reach of “big data” and “datafication,”
as agriculture has been significantly disrupted by big data application
despite being one of “the most traditional of traditional industries.”8
The impact of big data in this space provides a great setting to study
6.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (A joint work is “work prepared by two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.”).
7.
See Ellixson et al., supra note 4, at 52. In the United States, the Federal
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act regulates the practices of financial institutions in data sharing. Pub. L.
No. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.). In Canada,
financial data is generally regulated like other data collected by the private sector in the course of
commerce under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA),
although certain provisions of the Canada Bank Act may apply. PIPEDA, S.C. 2000, c 5 (Can.);
Canada Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c 46 (Can.). In the United States, legislation such as the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), provides federal-level regulation of
health data whereas in Canada, provinces and territories have their own legislative framework for
protecting the privacy of personal information (PI), or personal health information (PHI) that is
dedicated to regulating health data. Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections
of
26,
29,
42
U.S.C.);
see
Healthcare
Privacy
Legislation
in Canada, COLLEAGA, https://www.colleaga.org/article/healthcare-privacy-legislation-canada
[https://perma.cc/9HBP-TCK8] (last visited Feb. 22, 2022).
8.
Leonard Brody, The Great Rewrite: Digital Reinvention, FORBES (Sept. 19,
2018, 12:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kpmg/2018/09/19/the-great-rewrite-digital-reinvention/?sh=4de3ce183a8a
[https://perma.cc/6JZX-Y6ST];
J.E.
Relf-Eckstein,
Anna
T.
Ballantyne & Peter W.B. Phillips, Farming Reimagined: A Case Study of Autonomous Farm Equipment and Creating an Innovation Opportunity Space for Broadacre Smart Farming, NJAS – WAGENINGEN J. LIFE SCIS., Dec. 2019, at 2.
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the role of copyright law as an instrument of reigning in access to and
control over data.
In fact, little has been written about the connection between
agriculture and copyright, unlike the relationship between copyright
and other sectors, such as education. To the extent that scholars have
addressed intellectual property (IP) issues in agriculture, the
relationship has been characterized by a concern with limited areas of
law, such as patents in agrobiotechnology and breeders’ rights in plant
resources.9 However, as demonstrated by the considerable media
attention given recently to the potential use of big data applications in
agriculture, the big data phenomenon has a specific context of
application in what is often referred to as digital agriculture or
precision farming, in which copyright is invoked as an instrument of
control over data.10
Similar to the emergence of digital health and digital biology,
digital agriculture involves using technology and data collection to
inform more efficient, timely, and site-specific farm practices.11 In this
9.
See generally Keith Aoki, Food Forethought: Intergenerational Equity and Global Food
Supply—Past, Present, and Future, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 399 (2011) (discussing intellectual
property rights in plant genetic resources); Chidi Oguamanam, Agro-Biodiversity and Food
Security: Biotechnology and Traditional Agricultural Practices at the Periphery of International
Intellectual Property Regime Complex, 1 MICH. ST. L. REV. 215 (2007) (discussing intellectual property regarding agro-biodiversity and food insecurity); Zachary Lerner, Rethinking What
Agriculture Could Use: A Proposed Heightened Utility Standard for Genetically Modified Food Patents, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 991 (2007) (discussing patent law regarding GM agriculture);
Benjamin M. Cole, Brent J. Horton & Ryan Vacca, Food for Thought: Genetically Modified Seeds
as De Facto Standard-Essential Patents, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 313 (2014) (discussing patent
licensing for genetically modified seeds); Jay Dratler, Jr., Food Patents: The Unintended
Consequences, 8 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1 (2015) (discussing patent law relating to food); Tesh
Dagne, Protecting Traditional Knowledge in International Intellectual Property Law: Imperatives
for Protection and Choice of Modalities, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 25 (2014)
(discussing the protection of traditional knowledge through intellectual property law).
10.
See, e.g., Norman Mayersohn, How High Tech Is Transforming One of the Oldest Jobs:
Farming, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/business/farming-technology-agriculture.html
[https://perma.cc/T9YH-G5JM]
(June
13,
2020);
Dan
Maycock,
The New Data Wave In Agriculture, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2020, 7:20 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/12/11/the-new-data-wave-in-agriculture/
[https://perma.cc/RN3Z-T77W]; Aaron Pressman, A.I. Gets Gown in the Dirt as Precision
Agriculture Takes Off, FORTUNE (Oct. 5, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/10/05/a-i-precision-agriculture-deere/ [https://perma.cc/GL9B-GC93]; Raviv Itzhaky, Artificial Intelligence and
Precision Farming: The Dawn of the Next Agricultural Revolution, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2021, 7:50 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/01/07/artificial-intelligence-and-precisionfarming-the-dawn-of-the-next-agricultural-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/V84E-3BGR].
11.
See generally Bertalan Meskó, Zsófia Drobni, Éva Bényei, Bence Gergely & Zsuzsanna
Győrffy, Digital Health Is a Cultural Transformation of Traditional Healthcare, 3 MHEALTH 38,
38 (2017) (discussing the emerging role of disruptive technology in the practice of medicine). “Digital biology” refers to the emergence of “the tsunami of genomic information … in research laboratories the world over,” derived from physical genetic resources using the next generation
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respect, access to and control over technology users’ data have become
the new frontiers of competition among stakeholders in the evolving
agricultural landscape, defined by the interconnection between
machinery, digital technology, software, and big data applications.12
For example, a farmer incorporating digital agriculture methods may
use a state-of-the-art combine harvester to harvest a season’s crop.13
Such machinery is equipped with technology to steer itself.14 It has AI
sensors that collect all kinds of data on soil moisture levels, soil
nutrients, the location of different crop types, and the volume of crops
harvested.15 The farmer can track all of these categories of data and the
corresponding agronomic practices, field notes, and other information
using a farm management app on a tablet, like the MyJohnDeere app.16
This data is typically uploaded onto the cloud (i.e., software and services
that run on the Internet, instead of locally on a computer) and shared

technologies. Peter W. B. Phillips, Stuart J. Smyth & Jeremy de Beer, Access and
Benefit-Sharing in the Age of Digital Biology, in GENETIC RESOURCES, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION 181–95 (Chidi Oguamanam ed., 2018); see also Section II.B (discussing the sphere of activities
and technologies describing “digital agriculture”).
12.
Various scholarly works address access to and control over agricultural data. See generally Neal Rasmussen, From Precision Agriculture to Market Manipulation: A New Frontier in
the Legal Community, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 489 (2016) (discussing ownership of
agricultural data in the commodities market); Sykuta, supra note 3 (discussing industry
guidelines concerning data privacy and security for farmers and ag data service providers); John
Soares, The New Frontier: How Sharing of Big Data in Agriculture Interferes with the Protection
of Farmers’ Ownership Rights Over Their Data, 26 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 229 (2016–2017)
(discussing ambiguities of ownership over agricultural data between farmers and agricultural companies); Strobel, supra note 3 (discussing data privacy rights for precision agriculture
farmers); Ellixson et al., supra note 4 (discussing farmers’ ability to own farm data); Leopold,
supra note 5 (discussing privacy and data concerns, specifically regarding property rights, for local
farmers due to agricultural data innovations).
13.
Scott Carpenter, Access to Big Data Turns Farm Machine Makers into Tech Firms,
FORBES
(Dec.
31,
2020,
10:56
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottcarpenter/
[https://perma.cc/766M-MQSP]. The scenarios and discussion of digital agriculture in this Article
are set in the context of smallholder farmers that are key sources of food and agriculture in the
world, as opposed to industrial farmers, although the task of defining “smallholder farmer” is difficult due to the heterogeneity of the group. See Devangana Kalita, Freida M’Cormack &
Jonas Heirman, A Literature Review on Farmer Voice 8 (ALINE, Working Paper No. 3, 2012).
14.
Tanya M. Anandan, Cultivating Robotics and AI for Sustainable Agriculture,
ASS’N. ADVANCING AUTOMATION (July 22, 2019), https://www.automate.org/industry-insights/cultivating-robotics-and-ai-for-sustainable-agriculture [https://perma.cc/HWF8-RCDX].
15.
Natalie Gagliordi, How Self-Driving Tractors, AI, and precision Agriculture Will Save
Us from the Impending Food Crisis, TECHREPUBLIC (Dec. 12, 2018, 7:50 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-self-driving-tractors-ai-and-precision-agriculture-will-save-us-from-theimpending-food-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/EB77-ZE4U].
16.
Id.
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with the company that owns the app, i.e., John Deere.17 Through an AI
application integrated with the app to process the collected historical
data, the farmer will usually receive recommendations for the following
year’s harvest.18
The data collected during the farmer’s use of the high-tech farm
equipment is of significant interest for many reasons; if the farmer in
the above example rents the land, that data could be sold to the
landowner so that the landowner can charge the farmer based on the
land’s productivity.19 The data could also be used to assess how specific
varieties of seed and hybrids belonging to affiliates of John Deere are
cultivated on such farm fields.20 The data could also be used to
recommend the company’s preferred agricultural inputs (e.g., pesticides
and herbicides) for the farm.21 Moreover, the data could be sold to other
actors in the agribusiness value chain, who could either determine the
price of products or target the farmer in their advertisements based on
the detailed data collected.22 Likewise, hedgers and speculators in the
commodity market are interested in this data.23 As a result, there is a
growing market for data of this kind among brokers (also called data
intermediaries) who specialize in collecting and then selling data to
whoever is willing to buy it.24 In addition, the data could simply be
17.
See Laurie Bedord, John Deere Addresses the Ongoing Risks of Living in a Digital
World, SUCCESSFUL FARMING (Apr. 23, 2021), https://www.agriculture.com/news/technology/johndeere-addresses-the-risks-of-living-in-a-digital-world [https://perma.cc/P4BM-RXD7].
18.
See Directorate General for Parliamentary Rsch. Servs., Precision Agriculture and the
Future of Farming in Europe: Annex 1: Technical Horizon Scan, at 16 (2016), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/581892/EPRS_STU(2016)581892_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SHS3-HGMG].
19.
Fixed and Flexible Cash Rent Agreements for Your Farm, PURDUE UNIV. CTR. FOR
COM. AGRIC. (Dec. 1, 2011), https://ag.purdue.edu/commercialag/home/resource/2011/12/fixed-andflexible-cash-rent-agreements-for-your-farm/ [https://perma.cc/NH7Y-YLYN].
20.
See Eric Rosenbaum, Deere’s Farm Version of Facial Recognition Is Coming to Gields
in 2021, CNBC (Dec. 10, 2020, 11:11 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/10/deeres-farm-versionof-facial-recognition-is-coming-to-fields-in-2021.html#:~:text=Deere’s%20farm%20version%20of%20facial%20recognition%20is%20coming%20to%20fields%20in%202021,Published%20Thu%2C%20Dec&text=Five%20years%20after%20acquiring%20the,on%20farms%20in%20summer%202021 [https://perma.cc/8YVZ-GQ7M].
21.
See Factory Fresh, ECONOMIST: TECH. Q., https://www.economist.com/technologyquarterly/2016-06-09/factory-fresh [https://perma.cc/5U7E-M668] (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
22.
See generally ALEXANDER ANDRASON & FRANCOIS VAN SCHALKWYK, OPPORTUNE
NICHES IN DATA ECOSYSTEMS: OPEN DATA INTERMEDIARIES IN THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR IN
GHANA (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2949722 [https://perma.cc/797A-N2MQ] (select
“Download this Paper”) (studying the emergence of open data intermediaries in the agriculture
sector of Ghana).
23.
See Rasmussen, supra note 12, at 503.
24.
Lois Beckett, Pro Publica, Big Data Brokers: They Know Everything About You and
Sell It to the Highest Bidder, GIZMODO (Mar. 18, 2013, 10:11 AM), https://gizmodo.com/big-databrokers-they-know-everything-about-you-and-se-5991070 [https://perma.cc/Z7QV-TDF6]; Yael
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stored indefinitely for undefined purposes in the future.25 These various
uses of agricultural data give rise to a range of legal issues that vary
based on the type of agricultural data involved.
The dominant mechanism for regulating access to and control
over user data is private ordering via contract-based ownership
arrangements which allocate the various rights and duties of users in
their relationship with technology providers, data intermediaries, and
data platforms.26 In general, questions arise over whether such
standard-form contracts, governed by conventional principles of
contract law, are adequate to protect the interests of data originators
due to three major problems: (1) practical difficulties inherent in
making privacy choices, (2) structural power imbalances, and (3)
inherent legal limitations that make contractual arrangements for
access and control over data ineffective. This contract-based ownership
structure is often reinforced through copyright assertions, which
underlie claims of how data are accessed, controlled, and shared.27 Data
collectors and processors assert proprietary and ownership control over
data, limiting the originators’ access to it.28 Even though privacy
regimes cater to technology users’ interests in their personal data, such
regimes are not generally relevant to data originators – such as farmers
– once the data is aggregated, anonymized, or de-identified.29 Even in
the absence of aggregation and de-identification, the scope of what
constitutes “personal data” under privacy regimes does not correspond
with agricultural data in many circumstances.30 Besides, data could be
observed from technology users or inferred and derived from the data
they provide or the technology they use.31 In this context, this Article
addresses the question: What recourse do technology users such as
farmers have to ensure access to the vast amount of data that originates
Grauer, What Are ‘Data Brokers,’ and Why Are They Scooping Up Information About You?, VICE
(Mar. 27, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/bjpx3w/what-are-data-brokers-andhow-to-stop-my-private-data-collection [https://perma.cc/K3GS-4KKQ].
25.
Cf. Jacob Bunge, Big Data Comes to the Farm, Sowing Mistrust, WALL
S T.
J.
(Feb.
25,
2014,
10:38
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304450904579369283869192124 [https://perma.cc/D55C-5MP6] (enumerating
farmers’
fears
about
potential
future
uses
of
big
data).
26.
See discussion infra Part V.
27.
See discussion infra Section V.B.
28.
See generally Pamela Andanda, Towards a Paradigm Shift in Governing Data Access
and Related Intellectual Property Rights in Big Data and Health-Related Research, 50 IIC – INT’L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1052 (2019) (discussing how data collectors and processors
approach data ownership and access in the healthcare setting).
29.
See discussion infra Section V.B.
30.
See discussion infra Section V.B.
31.
See Ferrell, supra note 2, at 16.
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from their use of technology, and how do users control the transfer and
sharing of such data in a manner that may not be prejudicial to their
interests?
Given the high stakes of technology-based activity for users such
as farmers and the food system overall, user data in a specific context
of application, such as agriculture, has a special and unique significance
for society—compared to, for example, the importance of social media
data to social media users.32 Boilerplate contract mechanisms of data
access, control, and sharing between technology users, technology, or
platform providers cannot address peculiar problems in different
contexts of data applications because the impact of big data and
datafication differ based on context.33 For the same reason, traditional
data privacy regimes are insufficient to address the concerns elicited by
the digitization and datafication of different sectors.34 This Article aims
to show that in an increasingly complex user-data ecosystem, copyright
plays a vital role as an instrument of control over data handled by
upstream actors (i.e., data collectors, processors, and aggregators).
Copyright law grants certain economic and moral rights to
individuals identified as “authors.”35 Although authorship is primarily
defined through an individual’s efforts to create copyrightable work, the
normative roots of joint authorship doctrine reveal that
non-copyrightable works can also be authored.36 Thus, it is argued that
a sui generis legal regime could be enacted to entitle “authors” of
non-copyrightable works, which are integrated with collaborative works
covered by copyright, to certain rights. When data collectors, processors,
and aggregators assert copyright ownership over user data through
contractual entitlement, the application of copyright law, or use of
technology protection measures (TPMs), the data originators should be
recognized as contributors to the authorship of such data and be
entitled to certain rights.37 Such recognition is necessary to provide the
requisite basis for trust in data sharing, thereby assuring technology

32.
See infra text accompanying notes 432–36.
33.
See Kevin E. Davis & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Contracting for Personal Data, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2019).
34.
See infra Section V.B. (discussing the inadequacy of data privacy regimes to protect
agricultural data).
35.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
36.
See discussion infra Section VI.C.
37.
TPMs include such things as encryption, passwords, and access controls that are used
to block or limit access to a work, or certain actions with respect to the work (e.g., copying). See
Dean S. Marks & Bruce H. Turnbull, Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of Technology, Law and Commercial Licenses, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 563, 597–98 (1998).
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users of their right to access and control data sourced from them.38
Given the globally pervasive nature of the big data phenomenon,39 the
discussion refers to users’ data access and control issues in other
jurisdictions. Still, the focus of the inquiry is limited to the legal
frameworks of the United States and Canada.
This Article is structured as follows: Part II sets the stage by
describing the transformative effect of the big data phenomenon in the
deployment of advanced technologies while also defining user data that
results from it as the primary subject of analysis. The discussion aims
to establish the backdrop against which issues of access and control over
user data arise by identifying key players and actors in the user data
ecosystem based on specific examples. Part III subsequently sets out
the legal questions concerning user data by demonstrating the
significance and relevance of the questions, using as an example the
ongoing dispute in the American poultry industry where sharing user
data with third parties without user consent resulted in litigation. Part
IV grounds the Article in the trust model of privacy as opposed to the
traditional Fair Information Practices model.
Part V then explores the contract mechanisms and privacy
regimes that govern access to and control over user data. While noting
that contractual arrangements for data-sharing tend to be exploitative
and riddled with power imbalances, the discussion shows that user data
often lies outside the remit of privacy regimes, thereby resulting in the
lack of recourse to data originators in guaranteeing access and securing
control.
The discussion in Part VI attempts to lay out a framework for
users’ claims to data grounded in the normative roots of copyright
doctrines, which cater to the privacy interests of authors of
copyrightable works. While demonstrating data originators’ lack of
38.
In theories of privacy, trust, and trustworthiness are emphasized as alternatives to
earlier theories that are based on the model of fair information practices—a model which focuses
on notice to end users and end-user choice, mainly through contracts. See generally Christopher
W. Savage, Managing the Ambient Trust Commons: The Economics of Online Consumer
Information Privacy, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 95 (2019) (arguing that trust is best viewed as a
common-pool resource for the online ecosystem to manage); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog,
Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016) (arguing that privacy
can and should be thought of as enabling trust in essential information relationships); Woodrow
Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952 (2017)
(arguing that lawmakers should provide more than “Fair Information Practices” in privacy law).
39.
See generally JAMES MANYIKA, MICHAEL CHUI, BRAD BROWN, JACQUES BUGHIN, RICHARD DOBBS, CHARLES ROXBURGH & ANGELA HUNG BYERS, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., BIG DATA: THE
NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY (2011), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/mckinsey%20digital/our%20insights/big%20data%20the%20next%20frontier%20for%20innovation/mgi_big_data_exec_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB6K-UVLV (providing an overview of the proliferation of big data).
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recourse to access and control of data under existing copyright, the
discussion also reveals how recent jurisprudential developments enable
the appropriation of user data as processed data and in aggregated
form, thereby reinforcing the assertion of rights by data collectors,
processors, and aggregators at the expense of data originators.40 In
proposing the adoption of a sui generis legal framework modeled on
copyright law to protect technology users, the discussion in Part VI
justifies the assertion that authorship of data has a basis in the doctrine
of joint authorship, recognizing the contribution of non-copyrightable
works in a joint work.
The argument advanced in this Article is that in circumstances
where data collectors, processors, and aggregators assert copyright
ownership over user data—whether based on a contractual entitlement
or an underlying copyright claim to the work—technology users should
be entitled to certain rights that mimic those granted to a contributor
to a joint work under copyright. Based on conclusions drawn from such
analysis, Part VII defines the nature and content of a potential
legislative framework for user data, identifying the minimum right to
control data disclosure and access as entitlements that such a
framework should accord to users. Lastly, Part VIII offers conclusions
and highlights issues for further inquiry concerning different data sets.
II. USER DATA IN THE BIG DATA ERA IN AGRICULTURE
A. The Big Data Landscape
There is presently no working definition for the term “big data.”41
The classic definition of big data comes from a 2001 Gartner report that
anchored the definition on several data-specific characteristics called
the “three Vs” of big data: volume, velocity, and variety.42 The report
proposed that volume refers to the amount of data, velocity to how
rapidly data are produced, and variety to the diversity of the data
formats.43 From a technological point of view, the “three Vs” definition
of big data is taken as “high-volume, high-velocity and/or high-variety
information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of
information processing that enable enhanced insight, decision making,

40.
See discussion infra Section II.B. (discussing various data categories).
41.
Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV.
773, 794 (2015).
42.
DOUG LANEY, META GROUP, 3D DATA MANAGEMENT: CONTROLLING DATA VOLUME,
VELOCITY, AND VARIETY 1 (2001).
43.
Id. at 1, 2.
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and process automation.”44 Later, the concept was expanded to include
a fourth V, veracity, which refers to “the level of reliability associated
with certain types of data” that brings issues of trust and uncertainty
regarding the data and the outcome of the data analysis.45 According to
Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger, “[b]ig data is also characterized by the
ability to render into data many aspects of the world that have never
been quantified before; … ‘datafication.’”46 Datafication is commonly
understood as putting a phenomenon “in a quantified format so it can
be tabulated and analyzed.”47
Datafication is manifested in a variety of forms. In earlier times,
datafication existed when “a relatively small volume of analog data was
produced and made available through a limited number of channels.”48
The phenomenon of big data builds on these early forms of datafication
by adding new technological units for data collection in the form of near
and remote sensors mounted on devices and machinery in a
technological infrastructure generally referred to as the Internet of
Things (IoT).49 The IoT technologies collect and aggregate data from
multiple data sources in the digital landscape, taking the form of
connected cars, wearables, home systems, home appliances, digital
assistants, and other technologies.50 It is, for example, suggested that
there will be at least 240 sensors on a new combine harvester and
44.
Information Technology Glossary: Big Data, GARTNER, https://www.gartner.com/itglossary/big-data/ [https://perma.cc/N2AP-SNXU] (last visited Feb. 21, 2022); Neil M. Richards &
Jonathan King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 394 (2014).
45.
Francesco Gullo, Giovanni Ponti, Andrea Tagarelli, Salvatore Cuomo, Pasquale De
Michele & Francesco Piccialli, Handling Uncertainty in Clustering Art-Exhibition Visting Styles,
in BIG DATA TECHNOLOGIES AND APPLICATIONS 54, 54 (Jason J. Jung & Pankoo Kim eds., 2017).
46.
Kenneth Cukier & Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, The Rise of Big Data: How It’s Changing the Way We Think About the World, 92 FOREIGN AFFS. 28, 29 (2013).
47.
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 1, at 78.
48.
U.N. GLOB. PULSE, BIG DATA FOR DEVELOPMENT: CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES
8 (2012), https://unglobalpulse.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/BigDataforDevelopment-UNGlobalPulseMay2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7LC-2VY4]. An example of these early forms of datafication would be data collected from farmers through geographic information (GI) system and as
global positioning systems (GPS) for the site-specific management of farm. See Mark Shepherd,
James A. Turner, Bruce Small & David Wheeler, Priorities for Science to Overcome Hurdles
Thwarting the Full Promise of the ‘Digital Agriculture’ Revolution, 100 J. SCI. FOOD & AGRIC. 5083,
5083 (2018); Nicoleta Tantalaki, Stavros Souravlas & Manos Roumeliotis, Data-Driven Decision
Making in Precision Agriculture: The Rise of Big Data in Agricultural Systems, 20 J. AGRIC. &
FOOD INFO. 344, 348 (2019).
49.
See, e.g., Muhammad S. Farooq, Shamyla Riaz, Adnan Abid, Tariq Umer & Yousaf B.
Zikria, Role of IoT Technology in Agriculture: A Systematic Literature Review, 9 ELECS. 319, 319–
20 (2020).
50.
See Ramnath Balasubramanian, Ari Libarikian & Doug McElhaney, Insurance 2030–
–The Impact of AI on the Future of Insurance, MCKINSEY & CO. (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/insurance-2030-the-impactof-ai-on-the-future-of-insurance [https://perma.cc/2EXT-C754].
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upwards of sixty sensors on a new, sizeable, state-of-the-art tractor.51
These sensors collect all kinds of data in their respective applications,
such as soil moisture levels, soil nutrients, location of crop types, and
volume of harvested crops.52
The digital landscape precipitated by IoT technologies is
increasingly transformed by the emergence of software apps and digital
platforms in various applications, which embrace AI-based data
analytics (i.e., the capability to analyze big data).53 With the
deployment of AI techniques such as machine learning, data analytics
are increasingly applied to future decision-making processes in health,
agriculture, consumer market, education, and other sectors for
predictive and prescriptive analysis.54 Numerous technology actors
have emerged in such diverse sectors to solve various problems using
AI, blockchain, and cloud computing.55 In agriculture, for example,
major seed, agrochemical, and equipment suppliers have become
technology actors by developing their own data analytics platforms.56
Leveraging the potential of big data for growth and innovation in
this growing landscape requires finding a balance between diverse
interests in data. To properly understand the diverse interests attached
to data actuated by big data, it is first necessary to identify the various
categories of data generated and collected, and then to define the
ecosystem of actors with a stake in these categories of data.
B. Categories of User Data
User data in this Article can be understood as encompassing diverse
categories of data stemming from individuals’ use of technology that
has data collection capability in general, instead of the narrower
51.
J. E. Relf-Eckstein, Anna T. Ballantyne & Peter W. B. Phillips, Farming
Reimagined: A Case Study of Autonomous Farm Equipment and Creating an Innovation Opportunity Space for Broadacre Smart Farming, NJAS – WAGENINGEN J. LIFE SCIS., Dec. 2019, at 3.
52.
Id. at 1.
53.
Shepherd et al., supra note 48, at 5085.
54.
See JACQUES BUGHIN, ERIC HAZAN, SREE RAMASWAMY, MICHAEL CHUI, TERA ALLAS,
PETER DAHLSTROM, NICOLAUS HENKE & MONICA TRENCH, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:
THE NEXT DIGITAL FRONTIER?, MCKINSEY & CO. 22 (2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/advanced%20electronics/our%20insights/how%20artificial%20intelligence%20can%20deliver%20real%20value%20to%20companies/mgi-artificial-intelligence-discussion-paper.ashx [https://perma.cc/8SM3-TRCR].
55.
See infra Section II.C.
56.
Syngenta, Bayer, BASF, Agricum and DuPont Pioneer’s Encirca have all made a name
for themselves as data holders and data specialists. See Jason Davidson, Bayer, Monsanto and Big
Data: Who Will Control Our Food System in the Era of Digital Agriculture and
Mega-Mergers?, Friends of the Earth (2018), https://foe.org/blog/bayer-monsanto-big-data-will-control-food-system-era-digital-agriculture-mega-mergers/ (last visited May 24, 2021).
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category of personal data, as often understood in data protection law.57
The web of interests surrounding user data can be distinguished
according to the various data categories relating to the origin of the
data. User data in various sectors become subject to multiple forms of
control (e.g., privacy, technical, and ownership control) by different
actors as it transitions through the chain of value additions after initial
collection.58 Therefore, it is essential to categorize the different varieties
of user data based on the source. Legal entitlements to data are
determined through the value added at the point of origin in each case.
The first category of user data in the era of big data is technical data.
Technical data are collected using sensors and tracking technologies in
digital applications, such as wearable technologies for humans (e.g.,
Fitbit), global positioning systems deployed on a farm, yield monitors,
and variable rate application systems that result in highly detailed
digital data.59 Typical examples of technical data would be agronomic
data (collected about a farm using state-of-the-art sensors mounted on
farm equipment), animal monitors, and tracking technologies to
measure soil quality and nutrients, moisture levels, and crop yields,
inter alia.60 Machinery that is now typically equipped with digital
sensors includes tractors, harvesters, sprayers, seeders, and irrigation
systems.61
The second category of data is activity data, which encompasses
things like farm operation data and daily nutrition and diet data.62
Unlike the aforementioned technical data, which are automatically
collected through sensors, activity data are often entered into a
software system through keystrokes.63 For example, farm operation
data are data about the farmer’s activities captured using a growing
57.
See discussion infra Section V.B defining “personal data” under privacy regimes.
58.
Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, Code-Dependent: Pros and Cons of the Algorithm
Age, PEW RSCH. CENTER. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/02/08/code-dependent-pros-and-cons-of-the-algorithm-age/ [https://perma.cc/YS7C-2H7Z].
59.
Shane A. Lowe & Gearóid ÓLaighin, Monitoring Human Health Behaviour in One’s
Living Environment: A Technological Review, 36 MED. ENG’G & PHYSICS 147, 158–59 (2014),

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1350453313002567?via%3
[https://perma.cc/RSK7-MN33].
60.
Imran Ali Lakhiar, Gao Jianmin, Tabinda Naz Syed, Farman Ali Chandio, Noman Ali
Buttar & Waqar Ahmed Qureshi, Monitoring and Control Systems in Agriculture Using
Intelligent Sensor Techniques: A Review of the Aeroponic System, 2018 JOURNAL OF SENSORS, Dec.
19,
2018,
at
1-18,
1.1
(2018),
https://www.hindawi.com/journals/js/2018/8672769/
[https://perma.cc/342M-KW95].
61.
Id. at 12.
62.
Id. at 5.
63.
See Maria Temming, Smartphones Put Your Privacy at Risk, COMMONLIT (2018),
https://www.commonlit.org/en/texts/smartphones-put-your-privacy-at-risk
[https://perma.cc/2KLV-AW87].

2022]

WHERE COPYRIGHT MEETS PRIVACY

689

number of farm management software applications and platforms,
which can be accessed on mobile devices and tablets.64 Farm
management software and platforms transform and externalize
farmers’ knowledge and practice into data by capturing information
that includes records of seeded acres, seed variety, spray dates,
pesticide details, animal feed, etc.65
The third category of data is machine and device data. This is data
automatically recorded during the performance and operation of
machinery and incorporates information like engine run-time, speed,
GPS location, and the performance of steering, hydraulics, and gearbox
systems.66 Machine data also includes service data, specifically data
used for vehicle maintenance and repair.67
Meanwhile, technical data, activity data, and machine-and-device
data make up what is conventionally referred to as “raw” data, in that
it is directly related to the subject of data collection, such as a farm or
the human body as a source.68 Another category of data is often referred
to as “cooked” or “processed” data, which is indirectly related to the
farm, the human body, or the subject of data collection in general.69 The
distinction between raw data and processed data is based on a
metaphorical explanation of the relationship between a set of data and
its original source.70 Raw data is unprocessed, whereas cooked data is
processed and analyzed.71 In reality, though, raw data are often shared
64.
According to the European Union Code of Conduct on Agricultural Data Sharing by
Contractual Agreement, farm operation data can consist of compliance data––the data required for
control and enforcement by the competent authorities, as well as agri-supply data (input)
relating to the nature, composition, and use of inputs, for example, fertilizer, feedstuffs, or plant
protection products. See Comm. of Pro. Agric. Orgs., Gen. Confederation of Agric. Coops., Eur.
Agric. Mach. Ass’n, Eur. Org. of Agric., Rural & Forestry Contractors, Eur. Seed Ass’n,
Fertilizers Eur., Eur. Compound Feed Mfrs. Fed’n, Eur. Crop Prot. Ass’n, Eur. F. of Farm
Animal Breeders & Eur. Council of Young Farmers, EU Code of Conduct on Agricultural
Data
Sharing
by
Contractual
Agreement,
4–5,
14,
16
(2018),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55e8e9ece4b09a2da6c9b923/t/5ae9bfb5aa4a990f066738d4/
1525268407672/EU_Code_2018_AgDataSharing.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF5S-JPLP] [hereinafter
EU Code of Conduct].
65.
See Tanha Talaviya, Dhara Shah, Nivedita Patel, Hiteshri Yagnik & Manan Shah,
Implementation of Artificial Intelligence in Agriculture for Optimisation of Irrigation and
Application of Pesticides and Herbicides, 4 A.I. AGRIC. 58, 59–69 (2020).
66.
Tiffany Dowell, Big Data on the Farm (Part I): What Is It?, TEX. AGRIC. & MECH.
AGRILIFE EXTENSION: TEX. AGRIC. L. BLOG (Sept. 1, 2015), https://agrilife.org/texasaglaw/2015/09/01/big-data-on-the-farm-part-i-what-is-it/ [https://perma.cc/M4NB-C4K3].
67.
See EU Code of Conduct, supra note 65.
68.
See Michael J. Madison, Tools for Data Governance, 1 TECH. AND & REGUL. 29, 39
(2020).
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 31.
71.
Id. at 39.
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with either technology providers (TPs) or software and data platform
operators through a cloud-based sharing system.72 Usually, such raw
data is processed using data analytics to extract insights relevant to the
respective application, such as agricultural production through inputuse optimization and better management of natural resources at the
farm level.73 But concerns about access to and control over data arise in
legal and technical constraints, which farmers’ and other stakeholders’
access to processed data of this nature and their control over the
destination of the technical data, activity data, and machine and device
data. The question that arises here relates to how legal regimes
surrounding access to and control over diverse user data sets affect data
originators and other stakeholders in the respective data ecosystems.
Nevertheless, before addressing this question, the following Section will
briefly describe the actors with diverse interests in user data.
C. Participants in User Data Ecosystems
Once user data is collected from a source, such as a farm, it becomes
a subject of interest to various stakeholders. The concept of the data
ecosystem, derived from the idea of biological ecosystems, best explains
the diverse interactions between the actors who contribute to
constructing or manipulating data and their related technologies in a
particular sector.74 Technology users are the primary constituents of a
data ecosystem.75 They produce and consume data for their own use,
such as making health, consumer, or on-farm decisions.76
For example, farmers utilize data to inform and guide decisions that
will improve efficiency through more targeted on-farm inputs and
72.
Id. at 41.
73.
Alfons Weersink, Evan Fraser, David Pannell, Emily Duncan & Sarah Rotz,
Opportunities and Challenges for Big Data in Agricultural and Environmental Analysis, 10 ANN.
REV. RES. ECON. 19, 21 (2018).
74.
Data ecosystem is defined as “a loose set of interacting actors that directly or
indirectly consume, produce, or provide data and other related resources.” Marcelo Iury S.
Oliveira, Glória de Fátima Barros Lima & Bernadette Farias Lóscio, Investigations into Data Ecosystems: A Systematic Mapping Study, 61 KNOWLEDGE & INFO. SYS. 589, 604 (2019); see JOSHUA
GELHAAR & BORIS OTTO, CHALLENGES IN THE EMERGENCE OF DATA ECOSYSTEMS 2 (2020),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341930759_Challenges_in_the_Emergence_of_Data_Ecosystems [https://perma.cc/KJP9-D2XE]. For the application of data ecosystem
approach in data ownership and control, see Teresa Scassa, Ownership and Control over Publicly
Accessible Platform Data, 43 ONLINE INFO. REV. 986 (2019) [Scassa, hereinafter].
75.
See Oliveira et al., supra note 74, at 601.
76.
See David C. Rose, William J. Sutherland, Caroline Parker, Matt Lobley, Michael Winter, Carol Morris, Susan Twining, Charles Foulkes, Tatsuya Amano & Lynn V. Dicks, Decision
Support Tools for Agriculture: Towards Effective Design and Delivery, 149 AGRIC. SYS. 165, 165–
66 (2016).
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automation applications.77 And linking data on an individual farm basis
will increase the productivity and profitability of farming operations by
generating prescriptive and predictive insights for the field.78 However,
agricultural data has more pronounced benefits in the production value
chain. In this context, value-chain actors such as insurers, storage, and
transport logistics providers utilize agricultural data to improve their
businesses and market position.79 Additionally, retailers, processors,
and consumers increasingly use technologies to ensure the traceability
of products in niche and premium markets like the agricultural
market.80
While technology users are the primary contributors to the data
ecosystem, TPs and data intermediaries have also emerged as
significant players. More specifically, TPs deliver hardware tools (such
as smart tractors and feed systems) and accompanying software
solutions aimed at mining, storing, and processing data.81 Many such
agricultural technology providers (ATPs) have, in fact, seized the
opportunity to develop their own data storage and analytics platforms.82
Data intermediaries are entities that capitalize on the value of
data in the so-called “data marketplace”: a platform on which data
products are traded.83 Mostly taking place within an existing value
network, such as the agriculture or health sector, data intermediaries
match supply and demand for data suppliers and consumers who “use
data to gain insights, develop applications, and make decisions.”84 Data
77.
See Emma Jakku, Bruce Taylor, Aysha Fleming, Claire Mason, Simon Fielke, Chris
Sounness & Peter Thorburn, “If They Don’t Tell Us What They Do with It, Why Would We Trust
Them?” Trust, Transparency and Benefit-Sharing in Smart Farming, NJAS – WAGENINGEN J. LIFE
SCIS., Dec. 2019, at 4.
78.
Id. at 5.
79.
Id.
80.
See generally ROBERT BARLOW, DREWE FERGUSON, MATTHEW GRACE, VOLKAN DEDEOGLU, ANITA SIKES, CIARA MCDONNELL & SAM BECKETT, DEFINING THE OVERARCHING REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTOMATED PRODUCT VERIFICATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF KEY INDUSTRY STANDARDS, FINAL REPORT (2020), https://www.mla.com.au/globalassets/mla-corporate/research-anddevelopment/final-reports/2021/v.rda.2004-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R58-MYW3].
81.
Linly Ku, 10 Agriculture Automation Companies Shaping the Future of Farming,
PLUG & PLAY (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.plugandplaytechcenter.com/resources/10-agriculture-automation-companies-shaping-future-farming/ [https://perma.cc/C8RZ-79FA].
82.
See, e.g., Tobias Buck, Bayer Keen to Shift Attention from Monsanto Woe to Tech Vision, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/63942794-1b32-11e9-9e64d150b3105d21 [https://perma.cc/4XBA-LPE7].
83.
Markus Spiekermann, Data Marketplaces: Trends and Monetisation of Data Goods,
54 INTERECONOMICS 208, 210 (2019).
84.
Jeremiah Baarbé, Meghan Blom & Jeremy de Beer, A Data Commons for Food
Security 8 (Afr. Innovation Rsch., Working Paper No. 7, 2019), https://jeremydebeer.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/A-Data-Commons-for-Food-Security-WP-7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2JFSRKT].
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intermediaries comprise data platforms, vendors, and consumers. The
category of intermediaries referred to as “data platforms” enables
others to upload and sell their data products, subject to varying
licensing models.85 Data vendors (also called data brokers, data
aggregators, consolidators, or resellers) gather data into privately-held
infrastructures and offer it to others, mainly for a given fee.86
Data intermediaries can gather data from both public and
private sources.87 They then scale “small data” and mash them with big
data “to construct a suite of derived data products, wherein value is
added through integration and data analytics, creating profiles of
individuals, groups and places, and predictions.”88 In agriculture, for
example, data consumers in the data marketplace may be comprised of
the farmers themselves, agricultural input providers, and various
actors in the agricultural product value chain (such as wholesalers,
futures traders, and hedgers).89
Indeed, this type of data provides more value for technology
users once it is converted into information suitable for decision-making
(using analytic data techniques) than it does if stored in silos.90 For
example, ATPs and data intermediaries often offer farmers data-based
“prescriptions” of future farming for a fee, in a pattern that has gained
traction as “prescriptive planting.”91 Farmers are required to share

85.
See Annabelle Gawer, Bridging Differing Perspectives on Technological Platforms: Toward an Integrative Framework, 43 RSCH. POL’Y 1239, 1240–43 (2014).
86.
See generally Fabian Schomm, Florian Stahl & Gottfried Vossen, Marketplaces for
Data: An Initial Survey, 42 SPECIAL INT. GRP. ON MGMT. DATA REC. 15, 16 (2013); see also Laura
Palk & Krishnamurty Muralidhar, A Free Ride: Data Brokers’ Rent-Seeking Behavior and the Future of Data Inequality, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 779, 810 (2018) (exploring how the commoditization of research data could further inequality in accessing credible data).
87.
Rob Kitchin & Tracey P. Lauriault, Small Data in the Era of Big Data, 80 GEOJOURNAL 463, 472 (2015).
88.
Id.
89.
See COMM. ON A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE HEALTH, ENV’T, & SOC. EFFECTS OF
THE FOOD SYS., FOOD & NUTRITION BD., BD. ON AGRIC. & NAT. RES., INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RSCH.
COUNCIL, A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING EFFECTS OF THE FOOD SYSTEM 11
(Malden
C.
Nesheim,
Maria
Oria
&
Peggy
Tsai
Yih
eds.,
2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK305181/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK305181.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6EG-7YDB].
90.
See Terry W. Griffin, Tyler B. Mark, Shannon Ferrell, Todd Janzen, Gregory
Ibendahl, Jeff D. Bennett, Jacob L. Maurer & Aleksan Shanoyan, Big Data Considerations for
Rural Property Professionals, 2016 J. AM. SOC’Y FARM MANAGERS & RURAL APPRAISERS 167, 169
(2016).
91.
Lyndsey Gilpin, How Big Data Is Going to Help Feed Nine Billion People by 2050,
TECHREPUBLIC (May 9, 2014, 5:02 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-big-data-is-going-to-help-feed-9-billion-people-by-2050/ [https://perma.cc/9NSG-DYJM]; Jacob Bunge, Big Data
Comes to the Farm, Sowing Mistrust, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2014, 10:38 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304450904579369283869192124
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their agricultural data with ATPs, data platforms, and intermediaries
who “process” raw agricultural data to offer solutions and insights,
which can then inform and provide guidance in farming decisions.92
There is a long history of increased concentration and
burgeoning alliances among TPs, data platforms, and various service
and product providers that are often built on ensuring access to the
different categories of user data.93 For example, in health, Google
recently acquired Fitbit, a pioneer in creating wearable devices and
immersive wellness experiences.94 Google also made a deal for access to
patient records from the hospital chain HCA—which operates 181
hospitals and more than two thousand healthcare sites in twenty-one
states—so Google can develop healthcare algorithms.95 Backed by big
hospitals, fourteen US health systems recently formed a company to
aggregate and sell de-identified data.96
Similarly, in agriculture, John Deere collaborates with each of
the so-called “Big Six” agricultural input firms for a direct data access
gate: BASF, Bayer, Dow, DuPont, Monsanto, and Syngenta.97
[https://perma.cc/63LN-FKX5] (discussing how companies are racing to offer prescriptive
services to farmers using the data generated from their operations).
92.
See Zachary R. Trail, Rights in a Cloud of Dust: The Value and Qualities of Farm Data
and How Its Property Rights Should Be Viewed Moving Forward, 71 ARK. L. REV. 319, 320 (2018).
93.
See PAT MOONEY, ETC GROUP, BLOCKING THE CHAIN: INDUSTRIAL FOOD CHAIN CONCENTRATION, BIG DATA PLATFORMS AND FOOD SOVEREIGNTY SOLUTIONS 31 (2018),
https://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/files/blockingthechain_english_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/74AV-GVXX]; Pat Mooney & ETC Group, The Changing Agribusiness Climate:
Corporate Concentration, Agricultural Inputs, Innovation and Climate Change, 2 CANADIAN FOOD
STUD. 117, 118–19 (2015).
94.
See Rick Osterloh, Google Completes Fitbit Acquisition, GOOGLE: THE KEYWORD (Jan.
14, 2021), https://blog.google/products/devices-services/fitbit-acquisition/ [https://perma.cc/9DDJ779G].
95.
See Melanie Evans, Google Strikes Deal with Hospital Chain to Develop Healthcare
Algorithms, WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2021, 4:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-strikesdeal-with-hospital-chain-to-develop-healthcare-algorithms-11622030401 [https://perma.cc/DQ8YVDPX].
96.
See Casey Ross, Backed by Big Hospitals, a Former Microsoft Executive Wades into the
Messy Business of Selling Patient Data, STAT NEWS (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.statnews.com/2021/02/17/truveta-patient-data-terry-myerson/ [https://perma.cc/7AH4-A42V].
97.
John Deere came to an agreement with the Climate Company to let machines from
the former interact with advisory services from the latter. Press Release, Deere & Co., The
Climate Corp. & Monsanto, John Deere and the Climate Corporation Expand Precision and
Digital Agriculture Options for Farmers (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151103005453/en/John-Deere-and-the-Climate-Corporation-Expand-Precision-and-Digital-Agriculture-Options-for-Farmers [https://perma.cc/XHX6-T6KV]. This agreement
was
investigated
by
the
US
District
Court
for the Northern District of Illinois from the perspective of antitrust concerns, and eventually,
parties
cancelled
the
agreement. See Complaint at 12, 17, United States v. Deere & Co., No 1:16-cv-08515 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
31, 2016); Press Release, Monsanto Co., Monsanto Terminates Agreement for Sale
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Moreover, major agricultural input providers have engaged in the
development, acquisition, and investment of data platforms.98 For
example, Monsanto’s subsidiary, the Climate Corporation, offers
FieldView, an interface that makes agronomic advice available to
farmers and interacts with agricultural machines.99 Bayer has
launched a similar service called FieldManager, while BASF uses the
Maglis interface and DowDuPont the Encirca platform.100
Mergers and reciprocal relationships across TPs, service and
product providers, data intermediaries, and data platforms raise
significant competition governance and antitrust issues, which are
explored elsewhere.101 A problem that is pertinent to this Article–which
has not received a level of attention proportional to the stakes
involved102 ¾is the question of data access and control among data
originators, such as farmers who produce data, and the many other
players who collect, aggregate, process, and utilize such data to improve
of Precision Planting Equipment Business (May 1, 2017), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170501006241/en/Monsanto-Terminates-Agreement-for-Sale-of-PrecisionPlanting-Equipment-Business [https://perma.cc/4NTJ-3FTW].
98.
See, e.g., FieldView Brochure, CLIMATE FIELDVIEW, https://fieldviewbrochure.com
[https://perma.cc/AU9Q-BHLS] (last visited May 25, 2021); Press Release, BASF, BASF
Launches Maglis, a New Online Platform to Help Farmers Improve Crop
Management (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.basf.com/global/en/media/news-releases/2016/03/p-16140.html
[https://perma.cc/4KH9-QYKV];
Granular,
PIONEER,
https://www.pioneer.com/home/site/us/encirca/ [https://perma.cc/2FUW-6VDZ] (last visited May 25, 2021).
99.
FieldView Brochure, supra note 98.
100.
Field Manager, XARVIO, https://www.xarvio.com/us/en/products/field-manager.html
[https://perma.cc/UA2S-QUED] (last visited Mar. 13, 2022); Press Release, BASF, supra note 98;
Granular, supra note 98. Field Manager was divested to BASF as in the scope of the remedy package of the Bayer/Monsanto decision. See Press Release, BASF, BASF Closes Acquisition of Business and Assets from Bayer (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.basf.com/global/en/media/news-releases/2018/08/p-18-285.html [https://perma.cc/LX2F-TDZS].
101.
Can Atik & Bertin Martens, Competition Problems and Governance of Non-personal
Agricultural
Machine
Data:
Comparing
Voluntary
Initiatives
in
the
US and EU 15 (Tilburg L. & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 031, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3766293 [https://perma.cc/W6CS-CCKD] (select “Open
PDF in Browser”); Ioannis Lianos & Dmitry Katalevsky, Merger Activity in the Factors of Production Segments of the Food Value Chain: A Critical Assessment of the Bayer/Monsanto Merger 1
(Univ. Coll. London Ctr. for L., Econ. & Soc’y, Pol’y Paper No. 1, 2017), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336665790_Merger_Activity_in_the_Factors_of_Production_Segments_of_the_Food_Value_Chain_-_A_Critical_Assessment_of_the_BayerMonsanto_merger
[https://perma.cc/XE7Q-4258]; MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, THE KONKURRENZ GRP.,
AN UPDATED ANTITRUST REVIEW OF THE BAYER-MONSANTO MERGER 1 (2018), https://www.farmaid.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/An_Updated_Antitrust_Review_of_the_Bayer-Monsanto_Merger-03.06.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AXQ-GTM3]; Tom Verdonk, Planting the Seeds of
Market Power: Digital Agriculture, Farmers’ Autonomy, and the Role of Competition Policy, in REGULATING NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN UNCERTAIN TIMES 105, 112–16 ( Leonie Reins ed., 2019).
102.
See Kelly Bronson & Irena Knezevic, The Digital Divide and How It Matters for
Canadian Food System Equity, 44 CANADIAN J. COMMC’N POL’Y PORTAL 63, 64 (2019).
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their business and market position. For example, there is a growing
concern that the concentration of agricultural data in the hands of just
a few large companies could privilege these companies at the expense
of farmers, thereby endangering both competition in the agri-food sector
and the provision of certain essential public goods through
agriculture.103
III. ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OVER USER DATA: THE RECOURSE THAT
IS AVAILABLE TO DATA ORIGINATORS
Given the centrality of big data to the transformative effect of
the current digital economy, significant questions arise about who
should have access to the vast amount of data that results from
individuals’ use of technology in different contexts and who controls the
destination of this data. For example, other agricultural actors—who
capitalize on digital agriculture to influence farm decisions and claim a
share in the benefits of farm operations – increasingly threaten farmers’
access to and control over agricultural data.104 Despite the abundance
of data that is generated through digital agriculture activities,
counterintuitively, farmers are increasingly faced with “data
drought.”105 In this respect, digital agriculture brings additional
concerns into the distribution of power and autonomy in agricultural
systems on account of access to and control over data.
Many authors and commentators in the social sciences have
pointed out that control over massive datasets could give TPs, data
intermediaries, data platforms, and others who access these datasets
an unfair competitive advantage in the marketplace.106 For example,
employers, insurance companies, pharmaceutical data mining
companies, drug manufacturers, and medical researchers all want
access to patients’ data to conduct research, assist treatment, provide
coverage, assess opportunities, process claims, and market products.107
103.
See Katarzyna Kosior, Towards a New Data Economy for EU Agriculture, 23 STUDIA
EUROPEJSKIE - STUD. EUR. AFFS. 91, 92–93 (2019); Bronson & Knezevic, supra note 102, at 65.
104.
See Atik & Martens, supra note 101.
105.
See Shely Aronov, Can Farmers Beat the Data Drought?, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2021, 8:30
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/01/19/can-farmers-beat-the-datadrought/?sh=44bee18c14ef [https://perma.cc/VYX7-P8BE].
106.
See Sykuta, supra note 3, at 59; Keith Coble, Shannon Ferrell & Terry Griffin, Big
Data in Agriculture: A Challenge for the Future, 40 APPLIED ECON. PERSPS. & POL’Y 79, 84 (2018);
Leopold, supra note 4, at 408; Jody L. Ferris, Data Privacy and Protection in the Agriculture Industry: Is Federal Regulation Necessary?, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 309, 309 (2017).
107.
See N. Nina Zivanovic, Medical Information as a Hot Commodity: The Need for
Stronger Protection of Patient Health Information, 19 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 183, 183 (2014); see
also Jianyan Fang, Health Data at Your Fingertips: Federal Regulatory Proposals for
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Agribusinesses could use data to inform their pricing models for seeds
and inputs, depending on the farmer’s historical yield data. Similarly,
ATPs could sell yield data to commodity traders where the equipment
harvests thousands of acres of cropland each year.108 A legal question
arises in these particular examples: How can technology users such as
farmers protect data collected from their fields? If this data falls into
the hands of competitors or other actors in the agricultural value chain,
it could give them an unfair competitive edge through, for example, the
discovery of farmer’s planting practices, fertilizer use, and pricing.
This question presupposes an asymmetric access and control
relationship between data originators and the actors who collect and
process this data. Such asymmetry is illustrated in an antitrust lawsuit
currently ongoing within the US poultry industry concerning pricefixing allegations based on access to agricultural data.109 Agri Stats is a
database company that gathers information from 95 percent of poultry
processors.110 It tracks twenty-two million birds a day and provides data
on the number of egg-laying hens that are on a competitor’s farm.111
This data consequently allows one to predict the number of eggs laid,
hatched, and ultimately reared on that farm, all of which are key
markers of future production.112 The data, which includes exhaustive
information about the internal operations of the biggest poultry
corporations (e.g., bird sizes, product mixes, and financial returns at
participating plants), is made available in a monthly report that can
only be accessed through an Agri Stats subscription.113 Several lawsuits
by farmers, retailers, and distributors are pending against poultry
processors on the ground that these companies have colluded by using
information from Agri Stats to keep farmers’ wages down while
simultaneously inflating bird prices.114 Although Agri Stats refutes the
Consumer-Generated Mobile Health Data, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 125, 135–36 (2019) (describing the
ways companies use consumer data).
108.
See Sam Bloch, If Farmers Sold Their Data Instead of Giving It Away, Would Anybody
Buy?, THE COUNTER (July 19, 2018, 1:12 PM), https://thecounter.org/farmobile-farm-data/
[https://perma.cc/E9X8-U38A].
109.
Christopher Leonard, Is the Chicken Industry Rigged? Inside Agri Stats, the Poultry
Business’s Secretive Info-Sharing Service, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 15, 2017, 10:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-02-15/is-the-chicken-industry-rigged
[https://perma.cc/7S69-64LU].
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.
114.
See Leah Douglas, Big Food Versus Big Chicken: Lawsuits Allege
Processors Conspired to Fix Bird Prices, NPR (Feb. 6, 2018, 6:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2018/02/06/583806552/big-food-versus-big-chicken-lawsuits-allege-processors-conspired-to-fix-bird-pri [https://perma.cc/G9GG-YPCU].
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allegation of collusion in the antitrust claim,115 a pertinent question
raised in this Article concerns the recourse available to farmers in
ensuring access to and control over the kind of agricultural data
provided by Agri Stats to chicken processors. Similar scenarios in other
domains of the agricultural sector could unfold with agricultural data
generated through the digitization of agriculture, and any number of
other sectors, given the increasing shift toward data and datafication
across the board, as shown in the discussion in the previous Part.116
The legal discussion surrounding user data is often concerned
with data privacy.117 Nevertheless, a key element in the transactional
relationship between technology users, TPs, data intermediaries, and
data platforms relates to data ownership, which directly affects who
controls and benefits from agricultural data. Access to user data is often
discussed in the context of property—to own is to have access.118 Thus,
it is important to examine who owns user data and exercises access to
and control over it, especially when data is shared with many actors in
the specific data ecosystems, such as in digital agriculture.
IV. CREATING TRUST IN BIG DATA: INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE FAIR
INFORMATION PRACTICES REGIME
In the era of big data, privacy norms have evolved to the extent
that early principles governing the collection, use, and sharing of data
are not considered up to the task of governing new privacy harms.119 In
the first wave of privacy protection during the age of personal
computing in the 1970s, the Fair Information Practices (FIPs) emerged
as model principles governing responsible data practices.120 FIPs-based
115.
Id.
116.
See supra Section II.A.
117.
See Thorin Klosowski, The State of Consumer Data Privacy Laws in the US (and Why
It Matters), N.Y. TIMES: WIRECUTTER (Sept. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/state-of-privacy-laws-in-us/ [https://perma.cc/9CWY-E8NW].
118.
Michael Carolan, ‘Smart’ Farming Techniques as Political Ontology: Access,
Sovereignty and the Performance of Neoliberal and Not-So-Neoliberal Worlds, 58 SOCIOLOGIA RURALIS 745, 759 (2018).
119.
See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 343, 343 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006); Omer
Tene, Privacy Law’s Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second Wave of Global Privacy
Laws, 74 OHIO STATE L.J. 1217, 1218–19 (2013) (arguing that even updated versions of the FIPs
fail to update the definition of personal data, exacerbate the problematic central role of consent,
remain rooted on a linear approach to data processing, and problematically continue to view information as “residing” in a jurisdiction).
120.
See generally CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW: CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE AND REGULATION (2d ed. 2007) (providing an overview of data protection laws in the
European Union and United States).
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approaches to regulating privacy incorporate a set of principles for
protecting the privacy of individuals through principles such as data
minimization, correction and deletion rights conferral, and industry
self-regulation based on notice and consent.121 The first wave of privacy
protection focused on “rectifying mistakes that have contributed to
ubiquitous commodification and corporate surveillance,” and the second
wave of privacy protection—which is currently ongoing—imposes some
obligations on data collectors and processors.122 Privacy protection in
the second wave incorporates FIPs like completing privacy impact
assessments (PIAs), hiring chief privacy officers (CPOs) and staff,
conducting audits, writing and adhering to industry codes of conduct,
self-certifying compliance, keeping records and paper trails,
automating compliance, and developing internal processes for
adjudicating customer rights.123
However, privacy scholars and policy makers have pointed out
the limitations of the FIPs approach are generally due to its focus on
atomistic, rather than holistic, personal autonomy and choice that rely
on industries monitoring themselves through ongoing internal
compliance to protect individuals’ rights to access, correct, delete, and
port information.124 Waldman, a prominent privacy scholar, notes FIPs
that have become common in the second wave of privacy “neither
materially shift privacy law’s political economy nor meaningfully limit
the information economy’s data-extractive business model.”125
Therefore, critical privacy scholars have long advocated that
privacy law should seek to guarantee values other than atomistic
individual rights to privacy.126 For example, Cohen notes that privacy
has social value and “furthers fundamental public policy goals relating
to liberal democratic citizenship, innovation, and human flourishing.”127
Nissenbaum conceptualizes privacy in terms of context-specific norms

121.
See Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD.
L. REV. 952, 952–53 (2017).
122.
Ari Ezra Waldman, The New Privacy Law, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 19, 23 (2021).
123.
Id. at 23.
124.
See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013). See
generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000)
(analyzing public-private partnerships in administrative law and approving of private actors as
“regulatory resources, capable of producing accountability”).
125.
Waldman, supra note 122, at 22–23.
126.
Id. at 40.
127.
Cohen, supra note 124, at 1927.
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of information flow.128 Similarly, there is a growing scholarship that
views privacy in relational terms of trust and trustworthiness.129
The context-specific information flow aspect of privacy and the
value of trust are salient points with respect to the consideration of
user-data governance as addressed in this Article. For example, in
agricultural data governance, the importance of trust is demonstrated
in the farmers’ willingness, or lack thereof, to share their data with
agribusinesses that develop digital technologies.130 Studies show that
farmers’ are reluctant to share their data with technology developers
because of the trust concerns arising from procedural worries about
transparency and distributional concerns about who benefits from
access to and use of farmers’ data.131 After analyzing the EU contractual
model for agricultural data sharing through the lens of the literature
on trust and contract agreements, Simone van der Burg and her coauthors argue that the contractual models risk protecting
agribusinesses in accountability relationships instead of fostering trust,
thereby disadvantaging farmers.132 Lack of trust in agricultural data
sharing is mentioned as a current barrier to the uptake of digital
agriculture.133
In line with critical privacy scholars’ attempt to look beyond the
traditional model of FIPs, this Article aspires to ground data privacy
governance on fostering trust relationships between data originators on
the one hand and data collectors, processors, and users on the other. It
demonstrates how copyright law can be leveraged to design an
alternative sui generis framework for technology-user data that
guarantees certain rights to be held by farmers as a basis for trust in
data sharing.134 Similar to trust-based proposals for regulating privacy
that would impose on industries fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, as

128.

HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY
3 (2010).
129.
See Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11,
11 (2020); see also ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 50 (2018) (“Information privacy . . . is really a social construct based on trust between
social sharers . . . .”); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law,
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 456 (2016) (“Intellectual privacy rules produce trust in digital systems
that enables engagement with ideas, political association, and truly free speech to flourish.”).
130.
See van der Burg et al., supra note 4.
131.
Emma Jakku et al., supra note 77, at 6–7; see also Leanne Wiseman, Jay Sanderson,
Airong Zhang & Emma Jakku, Farmers and Their Data: An Examination of Farmers’ Reluctance
to Share Their Data Through the Lens of the Laws Impacting Smart Farming, NJAS – WAGENINGEN J. LIFE SCIS., Dec. 2019, at 6–7.
132.
See van der Burg et al., supra note 4.
133.
Shepherd et al., supra note 48, at 5087.
134.
See infra Part VI.
OF SOCIAL LIFE
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defined by the common law, this Article proposes the recognition of
access rights and control of disclosure in copyrights that would form a
basis for the transactional relationship between agricultural data
ecosystem players.135
The discussion in the following Part makes a case for staking
new ground for user-data governance by first addressing the nature of
access to and control over user data and how the legal relationship
between data originators and other actors who collect, process, and
utilize such data is defined and protected under existing law. Then,
after exploring the current state of the law and demonstrating the
potential power imbalance it creates in favor of TPs, data
intermediaries, and data platforms, the discussion centers on how the
law should structure such a relationship by modeling copyright.
V. EXISTING MECHANISMS FOR ACCESS TO AND CONTROL OF DATA
To a large extent, contract law, data protection law (also called
data privacy law), and ownership regimes govern the relationship
between data originators and others who access and control data.136
Contractual stipulations regulate the relationship between technology
users functioning as data originators, such as farmers and other actors
like data collectors, processors, and users, giving technology users a
private cause of action against a contracting party concerning the type
of data addressed by the relevant contract.137 While privacy regimes
generally serve the interests of data originators in accessing and
controlling certain categories of data, some types of data may be subject
to other actors’ ownership interests.138 The discussion in this Part
explores the rights and interests of technology users under existing law
and arrangements from the perspective of farmers’ access and control
over agricultural data.

135.
See Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99
WASH. U. L. REV. 961, 964–65; Balkin, supra note 129; Claudia E. Haupt, Platforms as Trustees:
Information Fiduciaries and the Value of Analogy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 34, 34 (2020).
136.
See generally Mark Bartholomew, Intellectual Property’s Lessons for Information
Privacy, 92 NEB. L. REV. 746 (2014) (discussing how property and intellectual property concepts
map onto information privacy regulation).
137.
See Davis & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 33, at 682.
138.
See discussion infra Section 5.B.
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A. Contracting for User Data
The primary means by which user data is controlled, managed,
and shared consist of private ordering mechanisms through
terms-of-service agreements, including end-user licensing agreements
(EULAs), privacy policies, terms of service, and other online contracts
or disclaimers that technology users must agree to before installing
software on their phones, tablets, or other hardware.139 In general,
questions arise over whether such standard-form contracts, governed
by conventional principles of contract law, are adequate to protect the
interests of data originators due to three major problems: practical
difficulties inherent in making privacy choices, structural power
imbalances, and inherent legal limitations that make ineffective
contractual arrangements for access and control over data.
In terms of practical difficulties, data originators use data
platforms to store and analyze their data without reading the
contractual stipulations that outline which entities are granted access
to their data.140 A survey of farmers in Australia found that 74 percent
of respondents “did not know much about the terms and conditions
relating to data collection in their agreement with service providers.”141
These contracts usually define the terms of data collection, use, and
transfer, and specify which entities are granted access to the farmers’
individual and aggregated data.142 Typically, in such contracts, farmers
“own” their data.143 Representatives for ATPs have publicly stated that
farmers will continue to own whatever data are generated by or
collected on their operations and can opt out of ATP cloud services if

139.
See Davis & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 33, at 663; Garrett Ledgerwood, Virtually
Liable, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 811, 815 (2009).
140.
See Patricia Sanchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online
Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 704 (2010).
141.
Wiseman et al., supra note 131, at 3.
142.
Id. at 8.
143.
For example, Climate FieldView, Bayor/Monsanto’s platform, provides that, “[a]s
between [the farmer] and Climate, [the farmer] own[s] all Customer Farm Data.” Climate
FieldView Terms of Service, CLIMATE FIELDVIEW https://climatefieldview.ca/legal/climatefieldview-terms-of-service [https://perma.cc/97G5-J3Z3] (last updated July 30, 2021). John Deer’s
platform provides “[the farmers] retain all ownership rights in [their] content.” John Deere User
Account Terms and Conditions, JOHN DEERE, https://www.deere.com/en/privacy-anddata/myjohndeere/terms/ [https://perma.cc/8VM3-S8VP] (Nov. 1, 2021). See also Simone van der
Burg, Marc-Jeroen Bogaardt & Sjaak Wolfert, Ethics of Smart Farming: Current Questions and
Directions for Responsible Innovation Towards the Future, NJAS – WAGENINGEN J. LIFE SCIS.,
Dec. 2019 (discussing ethical challenges raised by smart farming and related to data ownership
and access).

702

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:4:675

they so choose.144 However, it is unclear what ownership of user data
looks like once the data is de-identified (i.e., personally identifiable
information is removed from the data) or to which party the data is
transferred, even without de-identification.
In terms of structural power imbalances, data originators face
information barriers that result in them ostensibly agreeing to have
their data collected by corporations.145 In a typical digital agriculture
arrangement, data intermediaries and ATPs perpetually accumulate
data from farmers, often in exchange for subscription fees for services
on their platforms.146 However, the value extracted from such data is
rarely shared with those farmers.147 Besides, farmers are usually also
unknowingly accepting the terms of ATPs that control or benefit from
digital agriculture.148 In this respect, the power imbalance between data
contributors and data aggregators is evidenced by the inability of
farmers to negotiate the standard terms of large agribusiness data
licenses that govern agricultural technology.149 Furthermore, farmers
may not have control over the data they generate since their use of such
data will depend on third-party infrastructure and software.150 In
agreeing to the disclosure of data to third parties, data originators have

144.
In its “Guiding Principles on Data and Privacy,” for example, the Climate Corporation
(a Bayer/Monsanto subsidiary that collects and analyzes agricultural data) has stated that a
farmer’s shared data will still be owned by the farmer and only used to deliver and improve on the
services to which the farmer is subscribed. See Mike Stern, The Climate Corporation Principles,
CLIMATE CORP., https://www.climate.com/static/cms/principles/ [https://perma.cc/C9NR-J9HP]
(last visited May 27, 2021); see also Lina Khan, Monsanto’s Scary New Schemes: Why Does It Really Want All This Data?, SALON (Dec. 29, 2013, 7:00 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2013/12/29/monsantos_scary_new_scheme_why_does_it_really_want_all_this_data/ [https://perma.cc/H22Y-SGSV] (noting that Monsanto did not take a
position on whether farmers own their data when asked).
145.
Davis & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 33, at 664 (arguing that in such standard form
contracts for data collection, consumers face information barriers that lead them to misperceive or
not fully internalize the nature and consequences of transactions).
146.
See Bronson & Knezevic, supra note 102 (discussing the accumulation of data by agribusinesses and the inequity that causes).
147.
See Wiseman et al., supra note 131, at 8.
148.
Peter Waldman & Lydia Mulvany, Farmers Fight John Deere Over Who Gets to Fix an
$800,000 Tractor, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 5, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-03-05/farmers-fight-john-deere-over-who-gets-to-fix-an-800-000tractor [https://perma.cc/5HS8-SEGX].
149.
Wiseman et al., supra note 131, at 9.
150.
Joseph Russo, Data Privacy, Ownership in Precision Agriculture, PRECISIONAG (Sept.
3, 2013), https://www.precisionag.com/digital-farming/data-management/data-privacy-ownershipin-precision-agriculture/ [https://perma.cc/5DRN-K5TK].
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little sense of the universe of third parties who are likely to also have
access to the data.151
Even without the practical difficulties of privacy control and
structural power imbalances, contract law may pose a challenge to data
originators’ control of data. Given that the contractual protections apply
only to original transacting parties, the data originators’ consent in
collecting data is not dispositive of their ability to access and control
data.152 In this case, contractual rights and duties that typically only
bind the contracting parties may be of limited value when data is
transferred to other parties.153 It is contended that “[i]t is possible to
‘own’ [agricultural] data [as a matter binding between two contracting
parties] but have little control over who and how the data is used.”154 In
a trend that scholars of critical data studies characterize as “data grab”
and which political economy scholars frame as the new “extraction,”
contractual arrangements are increasingly used to “dispossess” farmers
of their agricultural data and the value it may generate.155 This is often
referred to as the “digital data divide,” a divide between those who
contribute data to gain actionable information in a usable form and
those who control, aggregate, and share that data.156
The challenges of ensuring access to and control over data
through contractual arrangements that uniquely privilege those who
collect, process, and utilize data necessitates legal intervention to
mandatorily regulate the collection, use, and ownership of data on
behalf of data originators, such as farmers. In the absence of such a
regulatory regime in agriculture, a set of instruments that incorporate
voluntary rules and principles regarding ownership and control of
agricultural data have emerged in the European Union, the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand.157 In the United States and
151.
See Joseph Turow, Jennifer King, Chris Jay Hoofnatle, Amy Bleakley & Michael
Hennessey, Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It 4 (Univ.
Penn. Annenberg Sch. for Commc’n, Departmental Paper No. 9, 2009).
152.
Patricia Sanchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online
Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 715–16 (2010).
153.
Davis & Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 33, at 664–65.
154.
Wiseman et. al, supra note 131, at 8.
155.
See Alistair Fraser, Land Grab/Data Grab: Precision Agriculture and Its New
Horizons, 46 J. PEASANT STUD. 893, 895–96 (2019) (discussing the concept of “data grab”); see also
J. Sadawoski, The Internet of Landlords: Digital Platforms and New Mechanisms of Rentier
Capitalism, 52 ANTIPODE 562, 570–71 (2020) (discussing data “extraction”); JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 48–49
(2019) (discussing the legal framework enabling the collecting and processing of personal data).
156.
Mark Andrejevic, The Big Data Divide, 8 INT’L J. COMMC’N 1673, 1674 (2014).
157.
See generally EU Code of Conduct, supra note 64 (providing general principles for
sharing agricultural data in the European Union); Privacy and Security Principles for Farm Data
Agreement, FARM & DAIRY (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.farmanddairy.com/news/privacy-security-
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Canada, Ag Data Transparent (ADT) aims to incentivize ATPs to
increase transparency in data contracts by assessing and certifying
data contracts between ATPs and farmers, thereby reflecting a set of
principles as ADT.158 These voluntary initiatives, particularly the EU
and US rules and principles, seek to emulate the EU General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) by assigning primary data “ownership”
rights to farmers.159 However, these rules and principles accept the
primacy of contracts over proposed rights for farmers and may not, in
their legal design, respond to the challenges of ensuring access to and
control over data in the relationship between farmers and ATPs, even
if adopted as legally binding laws.160
Therefore, it is necessary to examine any protection that data
originators might have regarding access to and control over their data
under legal regimes that mandatorily bind contracting parties in these
circumstances. Hence, the question remains of whether data originators
can assert a level of access to and control over user data under the
privacy regime.
B. User Data and Privacy Regimes
An area of law that could enable technology users to assert
control over and access the data they originate is data privacy law. The
Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act (PIPEDA), the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), and
Europe’s GDPR are examples of privacy legislation to regulate the
collection, aggregation, and sharing of “personal data” generated by
data originators who qualify as “data subjects.”161

principles-farm-data-agreement/226798.html [https://perma.cc/JDZ9-RSLF] (describing the data
collection privacy and security agreement formed by agribusinesses and groups representing
American farmers); Australian Farm Data Code, NAT’L FARMERS’ FED’N, https://nff.org.au/programs/australian-farm-data [https://perma.cc/TZ4T-N8WW] (describing guidance for service providers who manage data on behalf of Australian farmers); N.Z. FARM DATA CODE OF PRAC., FARM
DATA
CODE
OF
PRACTICE
(2021),
http://www.farmdatacode.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Farm-Data-Code-of-Practice-Version-1.1_lowres_singles.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8C23-AL8C] (providing general principles for owning, processing, securing, storing, and sharing farm data in New Zealand).
158.
See What Does It Mean to Be Ag Data Transparent, AG DATA TRANSPARENT,
https://www.agdatatransparent.com/about [https://perma.cc/3BXG-UY8N] (last visited May 25,
2021).
159.
Atik & Martens, supra note 101, at 5.
160.
See id.
161.
PIPEDA, S.C. 2000, c 5 (Can.); California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199.95 (West 2018); Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard
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User data, constituting technical data, such as agronomic data,
activity data like farm operation data, and machine and
device-generated data, can have aspects that qualify as “personal
data.”162 Therefore, it is necessary to consider the relationship between
user data in general and personal data to determine the scope of
coverage of user data under personal data protection regimes.
Data privacy regimes generally center definitions of personal
data on information “about” or “relating to” an “identified/identifiable
individual.”163 An important task in determining the scope of personal
data is to establish the connection between the information in question
and an individual. The term “relating to” or “about” might be fulfilled
whenever the data reveal an identified or identifiable person. But
questions arise over whether “personal data” may be narrowly applied
to circumstances—such as when the information pertains directly to a
particular person, or broadly, such as when the information concerns
objects, processes, or events in the first place but inferences can be made
that relate indirectly to individuals.164
Canada’s Office of the Privacy Commissioner has adopted a
contextual approach to the scope of “about,” which considers the context
of the information collection, use, and disclosure.165 Thus, it has been
decided that the sales records of independent real estate agents
constitute commercial information connected with the business being
conducted and personal information concerning the individual real
estate agents.166 Photographing tenants’ apartments without consent is
likewise considered a violation of privacy if details of the apartments in

to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O. J. (L 119) [hereinafter Processing Personal Data].
162.
See supra Section 2.B.
163.
PIPEDA, S.C. 2000, c 5, s 2 (Can.) (“personal information means information about an
identifiable individual.”); CIV. § 1798.140(o)(1); Processing Personal Data, supra note 162, at 33.
See also Normann Witzleb & Julian Wagner, When Is Personal Data “About” or “Relating to” an
Individual? A Comparison of Australian, Canadian, and EU Data Protection and Privacy Laws, 4
CANADIAN J. COMPAR. & CONTEMP. L. 293, 294–95 (2018) (comparing definitions of “personal data”
across jurisdictions).
164.
See Witzleb & Wagner, supra note 163, at 294–95.
165.
The Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Position at the Conclusion of the Hearings
on the Statutory Review of PIPEDA, OFF. PRIV. COMM’R CAN., https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/advice-to-parliament/2007/sub_070222_03/
[https://perma.cc/7MAL-75CB]
(last modified Feb. 22, 2007).
166.
See Real Estate Broker Publishes Names of Top Five Sales Representatives in a
City, OFF. PRIV. COMM’R CAN., https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2005/pipeda-2005-303/ [https://perma.cc/3FH5-MCJD] (last
modified June 8, 2005) [hereinafter Real Estate Broker].
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the photographs reveal something of the individual’s personal
nature.167
Based on these accounts, user data such as agricultural data
containing agronomic information (including the nutrient content of
farmland), farm operation data that include the farmer’s activities
(such as how frequently spraying is performed), and machine data
comprising information about the frequency of using an item of farm
equipment may qualify as personal data when they are attributed to an
identified or identifiable individual.168 Agricultural data of this nature
can reveal the types of soil fertilizer used by a farmer on his or her farm
as well as the farmer’s practices and preferences.169
In judicial interpretations of the scope of personal data under
PIPEDA, the Canadian courts have adopted a two-tiered determination
of personal information based on the cumulative requirement for the
information to be “about” an “identifiable individual.”170 In Canada
(Information Commissioner), the Federal Court of Appeal distinguished
between information “about” an individual and information “about”
something else by deciding that information can only be “about” an
individual where it involves subjects that “engage [an individual’s]
right to privacy.”171 This right is said to connote “concepts of intimacy,
identity, dignity, and integrity of the individual.”172 Accordingly, air
traffic control recordings relating to air accidents investigated by the
Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board
were determined to be information “about the status of the aircraft,
weather conditions, matters associated with air traffic control and the
utterances of the pilots and controllers.”173 However, these recordings
and transcripts did not engage individuals’ right to privacy since they
consisted of “non-personal information transmitted by an individual in

167.
Cf. id. (finding that the disclosure of real estate sales representatives’ names and
number of houses sold without the representatives’ consent violated Canadian law protecting personal information).
168.
Cf. id. (finding that the disclosure of real estate sales representatives’ names and number of houses sold without the representatives’ consent violated Canadian law protecting personal
information).
169.
See Nathan DeLay, Nathaneal Thompson & James Mintert, Farm Data Usage in Commercial Agriculture, PURDUE UNIV. CTR. FOR COM. AGRIC. (Jan. 23, 2020), https://ag.purdue.edu/commercialag/home/resource/2020/01/farm-data-usage-in-commercial-agriculture/
[https://perma.cc/9KLS-3ZLS].
170.
See Info. Comm’r v. Transp. Accident Investigation & Safety Bd., [2007] 1 F.C.R. 203,
224–28 (Can.).
171.
Id. at 230.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
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job-related circumstances.”174 Hence, they “[did] not match the concept
of ‘privacy’ and the values that concept [was] meant to protect.”175
Similarly, user data such as agricultural data—forming an inherent
part of farmers’ economic livelihood – could be held to be job-related and
not strictly fall under the traditional notion of privacy. Although some
form of agricultural data could qualify as personal data, the link that
must be made between the information and the individual farmer would
likely be subject to a case-by-case evaluation on whether it falls under
the scope of PIPEDA.176
In this respect, the EU data protection regime better elaborates
the level of linkage necessary for information to be considered “relating
to” an individual.177 According to the EU’s Article 29 Working Party (an
advisory body providing the most authoritative guidance on data), in
order for data to “relate” to an individual, at least one of the following
three elements needs to be present: content, purpose, or results.178 The
“content” element can be established when the information concerns a
particular person in the most literal understanding of “relating to.”179
Meanwhile, the “purpose” element exists when the information is used
or is likely to be used to evaluate, treat, or influence the status or
behavior of an individual, compared to other individuals.180 Regarding
the “result” element, data can be considered to “relate” to an individual
because its use is likely to affect that person’s rights and interests,
considering the specific circumstances.181 This element is fulfilled if, at
the minimum, an individual could be treated differently from others
because of the processing of such data.182

174.
Id.
175.
Id.
176.
See PIPEDA, S.C. 2000, c 5, ss 2–4 (Can.).
177.
See Processing Personal Data, supra note 161, at 33.
178.
The Working Party on the Prot. of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Pers.
Data, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data, at 10 (June 20, 2007), https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2007/wp136_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4EMG-UR5J] [hereinafter Opinion 4/2007]. Although the question of whether
“about an individual” required a more direct link between the data and the individual than the
formulation “relating to an . . . individual” remains debatable, for the purpose of this Article, the
analysis relies on the “relating to” formulation given the jurisprudence is well developed as to its
meaning under the EU GDPR. See, e.g., Mark Burdon & Alissa McKillop, The Google Street View
Wi-Fi Scandal and Its Repercussions for Privacy Regulation, 39 MONASH U. L. REV. 702, 712
(2013).
179.
See Opinion 4/2007, supra note 178.
180.
See id.
181.
Id. at 11.
182.
Id.
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For agricultural data to be protected under privacy regimes, it
must also be closely associated with the data subject.183 This data
subject must be identified or identifiable.184 While the primary means
of identifying a data subject is their name, the subject may also be
identified by other means that render them “identifiable,” such as
personal identifiers like Internet Protocol addresses, geolocation,
biometric data, or browsing history.185 The existence (or non-existence,)
of this possibility for identification distinguishes user data, such as
agricultural data, from personal data.186 Since agronomic and farm
operation data primarily deal with farm-related information, the extent
to which these data categories can be used to identify particular
farmers
will
render
them
either
personal
or
nonpersonal.187
According to Recital 26 of the EU GDPR, in order to determine
whether a person is identifiable, “account should be taken of all the
means likely reasonably to be used, such as singling out, either by the
controller or by any other person to identify the natural person directly
or indirectly.”188 Factors such as the cost of conducting this
identification, the intended purpose of the identification, the structure
of the processing, and interests at stake for the individuals concerned
are taken into account when determining whether the subject is
identifiable.189 Where identification is not “reasonably likely,” the
information will be considered anonymized and fall outside the regime
of protection.190
However, it is often difficult to determine the level of
anonymization that information must be subject to before it is
considered satisfactory. Canada’s Privacy Commissioner has
historically advanced the position that personal data falls within the
scope of the privacy regime if “there is a serious possibility that someone

183.
See Info. Comm’r v. Transp. Accident Investigation & Safety Bd., [2007] 1 F.C.R. 203,
230 (Can.); Witzleb & Wagner, supra note 163, at 294.
184.
See Witzleb & Wagner, supra note 163, at 294.
185.
See Müge Fazlioglu, Beyond the “Nature” of Data: Obstacles to Protecting Sensitive
Information in the European Union and the United States, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271, 292–93
(2019).
186.
See id. at 273; Info. Comm’r, [2007] 1 F.C.R. at 230 (Can.).
187.
See Info. Comm’r, [2007] 1 F.C.R. at 230 (Can.); Real Estate Broker, supra note 166.
188.
Processing Personal Data, supra note 161, at 5.
189.
Opinion 4/2007, supra note 178, at 15.
190.
Id. at 21; see IRISH DATA AUTH., GUIDANCE NOTE: GUIDANCE ON ANONYMISATION AND
PSEUDONYMISATION 7 (2019), https://www.dataprotection.ie/sites/default/files/uploads/201906/190614%20Anonymisation%20and%20Pseudonymisation.pdf [https://perma.cc/F54Y-56LK].
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could identify the available information.”191 Nevertheless, courts have
adopted a more practical “reasonable expectations” test, in which
information is still considered to be about an “identifiable” individual
“if it is reasonable to expect that an individual can be identified from
the information in the issue, including when combined with information
from sources otherwise available.”192 However, even though a vast
amount of agricultural data can be “about” or “relating to” a technology
user, such as a farmer, it likely cannot be protected as “personal data”
under privacy regimes.193 There are two reasons for this. First, data
collectors often adopt a highly restrictive view of what constitutes
personal data because of the cumulative requirements that data be
“about … identified or identifiable” individuals.194 Second, a vast
amount of user data that can be considered “about” or “relating to” data
originators, such as farmers, may easily be “de-identified” or
“anonymized” at the moment of collection.195
Given the unreliability of anonymization techniques to bring
about irreversible anonymization,196 emerging data privacy regimes
regulate “de-identified” data through the prohibition of
re-identification, and set the standard for de-identification.197 The
CCPA defines the term “de-identified” as meaning “information that
cannot reasonably identify, relate to, describe, be capable of being
associated with, or be linked, directly or indirectly, to a particular
consumer. . . .”198 In addition to the general prohibition against re191.
See Psychologist’s Anonymized Peer Review Notes are the Personal Information of the
Patient, OFF OF THE PRIV. COMM’R OF CAN., https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2009/pipeda-2009-018/ [https://perma.cc/ZX2E-Z2QY]
(June 18, 2010).
192.
See Info. Comm’r, [2007] 1 F.C.R. at 227 (Can.).
193.
See Privacy Statement, CLIMATE FIELDVIEW (Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.climatefieldview.ca/legal/privacy-statement/#2 [https://perma.cc/53MW-LZ4U]; Anonymisation and Data
Protection, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. & POL. SCI., https://info.lse.ac.uk/staff/services/Policies-andprocedures/Assets/Documents/guiAnoDatPro.pdf?from_serp=1 (last visited Feb. 17, 2022)
[https://perma.cc/USV3-QQB9].
194.
See Privacy Statement, supra note 193. For example, the FieldView farmer interface,
produced by the Climate Corporation, restricts the definition of personal data to name, address,
and other personal details of the farmer. See id.
195.
See Anonymisation and Data Protection, supra note 193. Despite slight distinctions in
terminology, the terms “de-identification” and “anonymization” can be used interchangeably, as
both point towards the same goals. See Gilad Rosner, De-Identification as Public Policy, 3 J. DATA
PROT. & PRIV. 1, 3 (2020).
196.
Nadezhda Purtova, The Law of Everything: Broad Concept of Personal Data and Future of EU Data Protection Law, 10 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 40, 41 (2018); Robert Gellman, The
Deidentification Dilemma: A Legislative and Contractual Proposal, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 33, 39 (2010).
197.
Gellman, supra note 196, at 35.
198.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(h) (West 2018).
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identification—which is subject to certain exceptions—this definition
makes it a requirement that de-identified data be protected against reidentification through technical safeguards and business processes,
with no attempt to re-identify.199 Once personal data has been deidentified, businesses have an unrestricted right to “[c]ollect, use,
retain, sell, or disclose consumer information that is de-identified or in
the aggregate consumer information.”200 Besides the restricted scope of
what amounts to personal data from among the different categories of
user data, the possibility of de-identifying data enables TPs, data
intermediaries, and data platforms to render and use personal data
outside the scope of privacy law.
The newly proposed Canadian Consumer Privacy Protection Act
(CPPA), aimed at amending PIPEDA, also includes a definition of “deidentify” that is similar to that of CCPA.201 In addition, it contains a
general prohibition against re-identification, subject to certain
exceptions, and requires that technical and administrative measures be
implemented to ensure de-identification.202 Unlike the CCPA, however,
de-identified data appears to fall within the scope of the CPPA.203
Hence, it could be subject to privacy principles as personal data.204
Although it is unclear how much privacy-preserving control can be
enjoyed in the case of user data that is “de-identified” under the CPPA,
it would appear that data originators can enjoy privacy protection that
is at least similar to that of “pseudonymized” data under the EU
GDPR.205
To conclude, there are vast circumstances in which user data
may fall outside the privacy law’s remit. Technology users’ data can be
considered “nonpersonal data” if the data cannot be deemed to relate to
an individual, or the individual cannot be identified or is
199.
Id. § 1798.148(a).
200.
Id. § 1798.145(a)(5).
201.
See Bill C-11, An Act to Enact the Consumer Privacy Protection Act and the Personal
Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act and to Make Consequential and Related
Amendments to Other Acts, 2d Sess, 43d Parl, 2020, cl. 2 (Can.).
202.
Id. at cl. 75–74.
203.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(a)(5) (West 2022).
204.
This can be deduced from the fact that, unlike the CCPA, there is no provision
expressly excluding de-identified data from the scope of CPPA. See id.; Bill C-11 (Can.). In
addition, the drafting of the CPPA suggests that de-identified data is within the scope of the law.
Bill C-11, cl. 21, 22(1), 39(1) (Can.). For example, clauses 21, 22(1) and 39(1) contain new
exceptions for research and development, prospective business transactions, and socially beneficial
purposes. Id. These exceptions would not have been necessary if de-identified information were
not subject to the CCPA.
205.
MIKE HINTZE & KHALED EL EMAM, COMPARING THE BENEFITS OF PSEUDONYMIZATION
AND ANONYMIZATION UNDER THE GDPR 4 (2017), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/PA_WP2-Anonymous-pseudonymous-comparison.pdf [https://perma.cc/SDS5-UQYB].
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unidentifiable.206 In addition, user data in its various categories
frequently cannot qualify as personal data, even though it may relate
to individuals such as farmers as a manifestation of their farming
activities. Such data is often held in aggregated datasets as
de-identified data, with no possibility of identification at the time of
initial processing.207 TPs, data intermediaries, and data-platform
operators assert control over data of this nature, collected from
technology users, under proprietary forms of control.208
Data collectors, processors, and aggregators exercise access to
and control over user data within an ownership framework in the form
of copyrights, including “para copyright,” rights through technological
protection measures.209 These are often justified on the basis of
protecting investment in collecting, interpreting, processing, and,
sometimes, the creation or generation of data.210 In such circumstances
where TPs, data intermediaries, and data platforms exercise access and
control over data, the question addressed in this Article can be
reformulated as: What recourse do technology users have to ensure
access and control over user data that relates to them but is often under
the ownership control of others through copyright? In this sense, the
originators’ claims for access to and control over user data fill a lacuna
in the intersection of copyright and data privacy law. Such data does
not fall under the existing privacy regime because it often does not
qualify as “personal data.”211 Users cannot be considered to have
property-like rights over technical data, despite developments
regarding the tort of misappropriation in the United States.212 Although
technology users may have copyrights in some aspects of activity data,

206.
Id. at 3.
207.
Id.
208.
See, e.g., Kate Kay, What Data Privacy Could Look Like in the Metaverse, PROTOCOL
(Feb. 16, 2022), https://www.protocol.com/enterprise/data-privacy-intermediaries-metaverse-web3
[https://perma.cc/9B92-9MAT].
209.
See discussion of ownership of data infra Section 5.B. See also Dan L. Burk,
Anti-circumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1109 (2003) (characterizing technology protection measures as system of rights that extend far beyond copyright law).
210.
TERESA SCASSA, DATA OWNERSHIP 5–15 (2018), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.187_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2BK-KVQU].
211.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140 (West 2022).
212.
In the era of big data, the closest property protection afforded to factual data relates
to what is provided for “hot data” under the tort of misappropriation in the United States. See
Victoria Smith Ekstrand & Christopher Roush, From Hot News to Hot Data: The Rise of Fintech,
the Ownership of Big Data, and the Future of the Hot News Doctrine, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
303, 305 (2017). This state law claim protects the ownership of discrete facts for a short
period after publication. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 257 (1918); Chi.
Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., LLC, 677 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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such as farm operation data,213 it is not easy to assert these rights once
the data is aggregated with other datasets. Machine, device, and
technical data do not attract copyright in themselves either, given that
they often purely represent factual reality.214
This Article advances the argument that in situations where
data collectors, processors, and aggregators claim control over access to
user data as “authors” of that data, there is a basis in copyright law
jurisprudence to recognize technology users, such as farmers, as
originators of the data that may “relate to” them but is covered under
ownership claim in copyright.215 Two reasons necessitate such a
proposition. First, even though agricultural data does not qualify as
personal data, if it does not identify an individual farmer,216 it falls
within the broader realm of farmers’ privacy interests as individuals or
group members. Inferences may be made of an individual farmer’s
activities based on group or subgroup data. However, current data
protection frameworks do not recognize a group or collective rights.217
Second, the disclosure of agricultural data to third parties
without the consent of data originators, such as farmers, brings
economic concerns that are not covered under typical harms that
privacy law is designed to protect.218 These concerns could take either
the form of unjust enrichment by data collectors and processors who
control and exploit agricultural data through the exercise of copyright,
or that of exploitation by actors in the agricultural value chain who
position themselves in a better market position than farmers through
the use of the farmers’ data. Therefore, could copyright provide a basis
for user groups, such as farmers, to access and control data?
The remainder of this Article will attempt to offer a basis for
designing a sui generis legislation for recognizing the contribution of
technology users as data originators. Data originators’ entitlement to
user data in such a framework has a normative basis in recognition of
the contribution of putative authors to a collaborative work that is
private in nature. It is later argued that copyright notions of the “joint
213.
ZIWEN YU, ALBERT DE VRIES, YIANNIS AMPATZIDIS, & D. DANIEL SOKOL, WHO OWNS
CONTROLS FARMING DATA? (2021), https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdf/AE/AE564/AE564Db30mdqk94.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVM4-KE62].
214.
See discussion infra Section VI.B.i.
215.
See discussion infra Section VI.B.i.
216.
See HINTZE & EL EMAM, supra note 205.
217.
See Alessandro Mantelero, Personal Data for Decisional Purposes in the Age of
Analytics: From an Individual to a Collective Dimension of Data Protection, 32 COMPUT. L. & SEC.
REV. 238, 243 (2016).
218.
In traditional privacy tort, disclosure of data is objected to because of the emotional
harm it inflicts on the data subject. See Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J.
1131, 1146 (2011).
AND
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authorship” of “unpublished works” provide such a normative basis for
legal intervention.219
VI. WHERE COPYRIGHT MEETS PRIVACY: MODELING COPYRIGHT TO
RECOGNIZE DATA ORIGINATORS’ CLAIMS TO DATA
The relationship between copyright law and privacy law is
generally held to be disparate.220 But there are at least four
circumstances in which copyright law intersects with privacy law. First,
the enforcement of copyrights intersects with privacy interests
associated with the Internet Protocol addresses of those suspected of
copyright infringement.221 Second, the privacy interest of an
anonymous or pseudonymous author becomes an issue when he or she
decides to exercise rights in copyright, such as lodging a claim,
protecting a claim, or transferring the title of their work, particularly
in the United States—where, for an author to file an infringement
claim, their work must be registered with the Copyright Office.222 These
authors sacrifice their privacy if they decide to enforce their
copyright.223 Third, copyright law meets the privacy requirements with
respect to the interests of individuals who are depicted in copyrighted
works.224 This scenario arises in situations where the individuals
captured in a self-taken photograph (e.g., a “selfie”), or a photograph
taken by someone else, find themselves publicly depicted in an
unfavorable manner, whereupon they seek to remove their
involvement.225 Fourth, copyright goes in tandem with privacy
219.
See discussion infra Section VI.C.ii.
220.
See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property? 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1146
(1999); FEDERICA GIOVANELLA, COPYRIGHT AND INFORMATION PRIVACY: CONFLICTING RIGHTS IN
BALANCE 249 (2017); Margaret Ann Wilkinson, The Copyright Regime and Data
Protection Legislation, in COPYRIGHT ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS: CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY
THE CENTRE DE RECHERCHE EN DROIT PUBLIC (CRDP) OF THE FACULTY OF LAW OF THE UNIVERSITE
DE MONTREAL 77, 88 (Ysolde Gendreau ed., 2001).
221.
See GIOVANELLA, supra note 220, at 136–37.
222.
17 U.S.C. § 411(a); Matthew J. Astle, Help! I’ve Been Infringed and I Can’t Sue!: New
Approaches to Copyright Registration, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 449, 450 (2011). In Canada, registration
of copyright is not required to bring suit; registration only serves to deny the defendant the defense
of “innocent infringer” which is weighed in the assessment of damages. See Copyright Act, R.S.C.
1985, c C-42, ss 34, 39 (Can.); Milliken & Co. v. Interface Flooring Sys., Inc. (2000), 251 N.R. 358,
para. 27 (noting that “[k]knowledge [of copyright] is to be inferred from the facts of the case and
the burden of proving it rests upon the plaintiffs, unless the copyright in the work was duly registered under the Act”).
223.
Tom W. Bell, Copyrights, Privacy, and the Blockchain, 42 OHIO N.U.L. Rev. 439, 453
(2016).
224.
Aislinn O’Connell, Image Rights and Image Wrongs: Image-Based Sexual Abuse and
Online Takedown, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 55, 58 (2020).
225.
See, e.g., id. at 58–59.
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regarding the private nature of both unpublished works and works
intended for specific demographics: the author either does not authorize
publication at all, or authorizes a strictly limited publication of the
work, respectively.226
In the first two circumstances, copyright and privacy conflict
with each other.227 In other words, copyright enforcement in such cases
may result in the infringement of privacy rights.228 However, in the
latter two scenarios, copyright and privacy rights complement one
another.229 In other words, privacy interests are claimed as an
infringement of copyright.230 Such trends have received extensive
skepticism due to the apparent incompatibility of the purposes and
normative unfitness of the two categories of law.231 Nevertheless, many
scholars argue that using copyright for privacy purposes does not
constitute a misuse of copyright but is a testimony to problematic gaps
in privacy law.232
226.
See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Privative Copyright, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1, 44 (2020); Nita
A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1266 (2012).
227.
See GIOVANELLA, supra note 220, at 136–37; Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, C-42, ss 34,
39 (Can.); Bell, supra note 224, at 453.
228.
See GIOVANELLA, supra note 220, at 136–37; Bell, supra note 224, at 453.
229.
See O’Connell, supra note 224, at 58; Balganesh, supra note 227, at 44.
230.
See O’Connell, supra note 224, at 58; Balganesh, supra note 227, at 44.
231.
See Eric Goldman & Jessica Silbey, Copyright’s Memory Hole, 4 BYU L. REV. 929, 935
(2019) (arguing that copyright law should consider only economic concerns and free speech
concerns given the basic perception that tort law is best suited for addressing privacy concerns,
but recognizing the existence of domains where the use of copyright for general privacy purposes
might be legitimate); Alfred Yen, The Challenge of Following Good Advice About
Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 412, 413 (2016) (explaining
that allowing a plaintiff to succeed on a copyright claim brought in the interest of personal
privacy does not do much to protect the plaintiff’s incentive to create); Jeffrey Ritter & Anna
Mayer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for Moving Forward, 16 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 220, 222 (2018) (“[T]hese enormous data sets have nothing to do with the creative artistic
assets that copyright law serves to protect.”); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why
Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 549, 587 (2015) (“[A]ssertions
of protection for markets beyond the protected market—be they in relation to
privacy and reputational interests or more generally—raise the specter of great cost to society.”);
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1130 (1990) (“[C]opyright
law is grotesquely inappropriate to protect privacy and obviously was not fashioned to do so.”).
232.
See Balganesh, supra note 227 (arguing that the use of copyright law to protect the
dignitary interest and harms of authors which privacy torts are unconcerned with, and thus, form
a legitimate part of the copyright landscape); see also Margaret Chon, Copyright’s Other Functions,
15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 101, 103 (2016) (arguing that using copyright to
protect certain privacy and other personal interests “should not be categorically excluded as
beyond the legitimate purview of copyright’s concerns”); Amanda Levendowski, Using Copyright
to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 441, 443 (2014) (justifying the
use of copyright to fight nonconsensual pornography based upon the gaps in legal solutions
available to victims); Andrew Gilden, Copyright’s Market Gibberish, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 1020,
1022 (2019) (arguing that copyright routinely protects noneconomic interests, including dignitary
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In proposing a sui generis regime for data users modeled on
copyright, the interest under consideration can be seen as “noneconomic,” given the narrow definition of the “economic interests” with
which copyright concerns itself.233 However, loss of privacy of user data
“relating to,” for example, farmers could eventually lead to actual
economic harm that is not specific to the agricultural data itself as a
work.234 Given that user data falls outside privacy regimes in many
circumstances, technology users’ claims for access to and control over
aggregated user data rely on the economic loss associated with the data
—instead of privacy values in the data—in the tort context.235 As such,
the claim for access to and control over user data may be doctrinally
consistent with copyright in the broad framework of economic harm, but
as the following discussion shows, the claim arises from dignitary
interest and autonomy considerations that copyright is designed to
protect.236
Consequently, the next question is: What basis is there in
jurisprudence to support the use of copyright for privacy in modeling
copyright for sui generis law? This inquiry requires a brief examination
of the circumstances in which privacy is protected through copyright.
Given that privacy interests in copyright arise from an inherently
authorial claim,237 the following Section will examine developments in
the doctrine of joint authorship as a basis for data governance among
copyright holders regarding aggregated agricultural data and farmers.
There subsequently follows a discussion of rights derived from
copyright law, which a legal intervention should incorporate in
supporting technology users’ claims for access to and control over data.

harms, but masks this protection in the language of the market); Deirdre Keller, Copyright to the
Rescue: Should Copyright Protect Privacy?, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH 1, 36–37 (2016) (finding
protection of privacy through copyright legitimate but suggesting that U.S. law recognize a moral
right of disclosure).
233.
Copyright protects copyright owners from economic harm from market substitution.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
234.
See supra Section 5.B.
235.
Privacy in tort context refers to “privacy” in its “traditional” sense of “an imagined
sphere ‘of seclusion and protection from others (the public).’” MEGAN RICHARDSON, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO PRIVACY LAW 11 (2020). Such use of privacy contrasts with the way “privacy” is
“quite often used (especially in the United States) to denote control over personal information more
broadly” (the parallel language of the later context of privacy in Europe and Canada is
“data protection”). See id.
236.
See supra discussion accompanying note 212.
237.
17 U.S.C. §102.
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A. Use of Copyright for Privacy
There are two sets of individuals whose privacy interests are
already enforced under copyright law: authors of unpublished works
and individuals depicted in copyrighted works.238 The jurisprudential
roots underlying these privacy protections come from the UK Chancery
Court’s landmark 1818 opinion in Gee v. Pritchard.239 This case
concerned the privacy of private letters sent between family
members.240 Plaintiff sought an injunction against the Defendant who
intended to publish a letter Plaintiff had written him.241 Lord Eldon
concluded that adequate protection against the Defendant’s intended
publication could be found in the common law property right in
unpublished works, repudiating an argument that the publication
would be restrained because “that the publication of the letters by
Defendant, was a breach of private confidence, or violation of the right
and interest of the Plaintiff therein, and was intended to wound her
feelings, and could have no other effect.”242 Quoting Lord Chancellor
Hardwicke from the earlier case Pope v. Curl, he proceeded: “The
receiver of a letter has, at most, a joint property with the writer, and
the possession does not give him a license to publish.”243
These early English precedents and principles have been cited
with approval and relied upon in US cases.244 In the late nineteenth
century, Justices Warren and Brandeis argued, in their seminal article,
that common law copyright provided individuals with an absolute right
to prevent the unauthorized publication of their unpublished works.245
Thus, common law copyright provided the author of an unpublished
work with exclusive control over the work’s publication, enabling
individuals to enjoin the publication of letters, diaries, property lists,
etc.246 The common law protection of unpublished works was
subsequently subsumed under copyright, notably in the United States,

238.
See O’Connell, supra note 224; Balganesh, supra note 226.
239.
Gee v. Pritchard [1818] 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674–75.
240.
Id. at 670.
241.
Id.
242.
Id. at 671.
243.
Pope v. Curl [1741] 26 Eng. Rep. 608, 608 (emphasis added).
244.
See, e.g., Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297, 301 (Orleans 1811); Woolsey v. Judd, 11
How. Pr. 49, 58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855).
245.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890).
246.
See Stephen B. Thau, Copyright, Privacy, and Fair Use, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 25
(1995).
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with the passing of the Copyright Act of 1976 as an exclusive right of
public “distribut[ion].”247
Some essential features of the doctrinal roots of the statutory
right of public distribution (referred to as publication right in Canada)
have relevance for modeling copyright for data governance, as proposed
in this Article. 248 Significantly, the rationale for protection deviates
from copyright law’s traditional principles and assumptions about the
“creative incentive” and is, instead, based on non-economic
considerations that Balganesh describes as “‘privative’ claims.”249 The
protection is “driven by the desire to prevent any distribution of the
work because of the noneconomic harm [under copyright law] that such
dissemination is likely to cause them.”250 In this sense, the law protects
against any harm arising from the “mere dissemination or use of the
protected work without the creator’s authorization,” rather than any
harm from acts of expression of an appropriative nature, such as
unauthorized copying.251 The harm against which the author is
protected in such “privative claims” is distinguished from the protection
currently provided by moral rights because “the interference with the
author’s autonomy occurs not through any harm to the work [which is
the case in moral rights], but quite distinctively instead through the
work.”252 Thus, “privative claims,” which are currently recognized
primarily under copyright’s distribution rights, constitute self-standing
redresses to a “disseminative harm” that is often wrongfully seen as
parasitic on the “appropriative harm,” which has copyright’s economic
basis as its rationale.253
The implication of recognizing the self-standing nature of
redress against dissemination in copyright’s exclusive right to public
247.
17 U.S.C. § 106(3); see also SUBCOMM. ON PATS., TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS OF S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: PROTECTION OF UNPUBLISHED
WORKS 8 (Comm. Print 1961) (written by William S. Strauss) (discussing the significance of
publication in delineating statutory and common law copyright protection).
248.
In Canada, the equivalent right with respect to unpublished works is referred to as
“the right to publish.” See Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s 2.2(1) (Can.). There seems to be
slight differences between the two rights, as in the US publication occurs only when the possession
of works is transferred to the public whereas in Canada, making copies available to the public is
sufficient. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“‘Publication’ is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of
a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”), with
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s 2.2(1) (Can.) (“For the purposes of this Act, publication means
. . . making copies of a work available to the public . . . .”).
249.
Balganesh, supra note 226.
250.
Id. at 3.
251.
Id. at 7.
252.
Id. at 6. (noting that “the reputational harm [that moral rights protect] is fairly unique
in that it is limited to the author’s reputation as manifested in the work”).
253.
Id. at 11.
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distribution is that, normatively, the privacy interests to be protected
fall within the panoply of legitimate copyright harms.254 These privacy
interests emanate from the very act of authorship, rather than under
the tort of privacy.255 The nature of the interests involved in common
law copyright, now incorporated under the public distribution right,
cannot be covered by privacy torts, given situations “where the subject
exercises a critical role in the production of the content that is made
public and then chooses to control whether and when to disseminate
it.”256 Balganesh clarifies this point, noting “the subject’s autonomy is
not just about self-representation to the public but instead about selfrepresentation to the public as author” and as such, questions arising
over the appropriate scope of authorship are not the concern of privacy
torts.257 Balganesh argues that privative claims may be understood as
simulating the working of a lesser-known moral right: the right of
disclosure, which is recognized and protected in civil law
jurisdictions.258 Currently, the law in the United States and Canada
recognizes the moral rights of attribution and integrity; these two rights
are recognized in the Berne Convention.259 US Congress was initially
aware of the disclosure right and made a conscious decision to avoid
recognizing it; the situation could be different in Canada, though, given
the roots of the Copyright Act as derived from common law tradition
and Continental civil law.260
Thus, the right of disclosure could be recognized and protected
as an aspect of the public-distribution right for works excluded from
copyright post-1976 because of the copyrightability criteria adopted at
the time. In this respect, it is essential to note that early uses of
copyright to protect privacy arose from “the private nature of the
254.
Id. at 11–12.
255.
Id. at 33.
256.
Id. at 27.
257.
Id.
258.
Id. at 34.
259.
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept.
9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1241; 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (amended Sept. 28, 1979) (“Independently of the author’s
economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial
to his honor or reputation.”). The United States ratified the Berne Convention in 1988. Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
260.
SUBCOMM. ON PATS., TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: THE MORAL RIGHTS OF THE AUTHOR 115 (Comm. Print
1960) (written by William S. Strauss); Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2
S.C.R. 336, para. 116 (Can.) (“[I]t is important to recall that Canadian copyright law derives from
multiple sources and draws on both common law tradition and continental civil law concepts.”).
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expression that induces its personality-infused content. . . in the nature
of private communications,” and not necessarily from the statutory
requirement that the expressions be “original works of authorship.”261
There were trends in which US courts focused “on the process of
authorship without having to examine or assess the product of that
process—that is, the content of the work.”262 As such, common law
copyright could protect privacy interests in raw data, even if the data
do not meet the tests of “originality”.263
A hurdle to modeling a sui generis user data governance regime
based on privative copyright claims arises from such claims relying
exclusively on authorship.264 In privative claims, “the work is. . . quite
genuinely a work of authorship in that there is a salient causal
connection between the creator and the expression at issue, but the
particular content imbues that authorship with a subjectively personal
dimension.”265 In recent jurisprudence involving the use of copyright to
prevent unfavorable depictions, for example, the copyright remedy only
applies to situations where the person depicted is the copyright
holder—either the subject of the image is the photographer (as in a
selfie), or the copyright has been transferred to the subject.266
In the modeling of copyright as an instrument of user-data
governance that recognizes the rights of data originators based on
privative copyright, how can technology users assume an “authorial”
claim over user data, especially aggregated data that falls outside of
data protection law? In a privative copyright framework, this Article
argues that the relationship between parties who exercise ownership
rights over data under copyright law and data originators who seek
access to and control over such data should rely on recognizing
technology users as authors of such data. This proposition requires a
determination of the following two questions: (1) When does data
qualify for copyright protection and thereby become a subject of
261.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Canada’s Copyright Act has a similar requirement and states
that copyright subsists “in every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work.” See Copyright Act R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s 5 (Can.).
262.
Balganesh, supra note 226, at 37.
263.
See Thau, supra note 246, at 1 (noting that common law copyright could allow “one
who had a catalog of private possessions to prevent the catalog itself from being distributed, notwithstanding the fact that the catalog had little or no intellectual substance”).
264.
Balganesh, supra note 226, at 12.
265.
Balganesh, supra note 226, at 12.
266.
See Default Judgment, Doe v. Elam, No. 2:14-cv-09788-PSG-SS (C.D. Cal., Apr. 4,
2018) (finding that the plaintiff registered copyright over her intimate selfie pictures such that her
copyright infringement action was successful); Balsey v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 756 (6th Cir.
2012) (finding copyright infringement by a magazine that published photos of plaintiff in a wet tshirt contest).
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ownership? (2) If user data does not qualify for copyright, how do data
originators assume authorship status? After analyzing the question of
when data qualifies for copyright protection, first in the context of user
data that directly originates from technology users, and then in the
context of aggregated user data, the discussion that follows addresses
the question of when data originators might assume “authorial” status.
B. Copyright and Ownership of Big Data
Copyright is the preeminent regime for the ownership of ideas
expressed in a fixed medium.267 As such, it becomes a prime candidate
for the ownership of data expressed either by keystroke such as in the
context of activity data or by a machine that incorporates sensors. Could
data originators exercise a level of control over user data as authors of
copyrightable work as an aspect of privative copyright?
This Section first addresses whether copyright exists over data,
based on the distinction made by the law between facts and data, and
ideas and expressions, in addition to the requirement of human
authorship. In so doing, a gap is demonstrated in recognizing the
contribution of data originators to data that sometimes becomes the
subject of copyright, either as a compilation or as a work in the form of
processed data.
i. Copyrightability of User Data
In both Canada and the United States, case law has established
that copyright protection only extends to the expression of ideas rather
than the underlying ideas or facts.268 To the extent that data equates
with facts, as Justice Brandeis famously stated in his dissent in
International News Service, “[t]he general rule of law is, that the noblest
of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions and
ideas—after voluntary communication to others, are free as the air to
common use.”269 The US Supreme Court in Feist Publications v. Rural
Telephone Service (“Feist”) further elaborates the nature of facts based
on the idea- and fact-expression dichotomy stating, “the fact/expression
dichotomy limits severely the scope of protection in fact-based works
267.
See generally MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW (Carolina Acad.
Press, 7th ed. 2019) (providing an overview of copyright case law and legislative developments).
268.
See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. L. Soc’y Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, para. 25 (Can.)
(noting that facts are in the public domain as “trite law”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (noting that “[a]ll facts—scientific, historical, biographical, and news
of the day” may not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to every person).
269.
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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[. . .] copyright is limited to those aspects of the work—termed
‘expression’—that display the stamp of the author’s originality.” 270
User data, such as technical data in the form of agronomic data, often
is composed of data concerning conditions of farmland and collected
using various precision farming technologies and state-of-the-art
sensors.271 Farm machinery generates large volumes of objective data
in order to generate more personalized or spatially precise information
for decision-making on a farm.272 Data such as soil analysis results,
nutrient information, plant populations, and animal monitoring consist
of an objective representation of facts about the relevant individuals,
soil, plants, or animals.273 Copyright does not protect such data sets
because they fall in the realm of facts.274
However, it is less clear whether data is always
indistinguishable from facts, and whether copyright protection extends
to data.275 In New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. (NYMEX) v.
Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. (“Intercontinental Exchange”), the US
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether copyright
protection exists in the individual price values that NYMEX sets as
settlement prices for its own futures contracts and hybrid commodity
instruments.276 The court considered the question of whether NYMEX
could receive copyright protection in its settlement prices, relying on
the issue of whether settlement prices were figures that merely existed
within the marketplace and subsequently discovered by NYMEX, or
whether NYMEX created its settlement prices.277 The court ultimately
determined not to provide copyright protection, arguing that the merger
doctrine must apply.278 The merger doctrine, broadly recognized in the
United States and Canada, upholds that when a work of authorship is
incapable of being expressed as a practical matter in more than one or

270.
Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
271.
Sjaak Wolfert, Lan Ge, Cor Verdouw & Marc-Jean Bogarrdt, Big Data in Smart Farming – A Review, 153 AGRIC. SYS. 69, 70 (2017).
272.
See id. at 72.
273.
See id.
274.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
275.
For conceptual distinction between facts and data, see SCASSA, supra note 210 at 3–4
(noting the distinction between representative data from implied and derived data and observing
that implied and derived data may be treated differently in both Canada and the United States).
See also Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 43 (2007) (arguing that original expressions that generate facts once adopted by social
convention should be protected to incentivize the creation of the expression and the generated
facts).
276.
N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc v. Intercont’l, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 2007).
277.
Id. at 114.
278.
Id. at 118.
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a small number of ways, such work is “merged” with the idea that is
expressed. 279 However, it noted that the matter of whether settlement
prices are “discovered” or “created” was a “close question;” it would not
“decide whether settlement prices are unoriginal” and was “particularly
reluctant to hold, as a matter of law, that [NYMEX]… discover[ed] the
settlement prices.”280
Similarly, the court in BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
seemed open to the possibility that copyright could extend to “raw data
that have been converted into a final value through the use of an
original formula,” depending on the “degree of consensus and objectivity
that attaches to the formula.”281 In considering the originality of—and
thus the possibility of extending copyright protection to—calculated
percentages, the court explained that “the more acceptance a financial
measure obtains (i.e., the more successful it is), the more ‘fact-like’ it
becomes.”282
In both BanxCorp and Intercontinental Exchange, the ultimate
decision relied on the application of the merger doctrine.283 The data
cannot be protected by copyright law.284 Notably, the data under
consideration in both cases constituted an authored work of expression;
therefore, it could be covered by copyright as an authored work.285
However, considering that these data represented the idea behind the
analytics that led to their creation, extending copyright protection
would have been tantamount to granting a monopoly over the idea.286
Thus, copyright can protect data if the process through which it is
created fulfills the legal requirements of creation as an original
expression.
US jurisprudence on the copyrightability of raw and processed
data is consistent with the decisions in Canada. In Geophysical Service,
Inc. v. Encana Corp.,287 the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench categorized
seismic data about the ocean floor into field and processed data.288 The
field data were described as “[t]he original recorded geophysical data,
279.
See Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine, 63 J. COPYSOC’Y U.S.A. 417, 417 (2016); Red Label Vacations, Inc. v. 411 Travel Buys Ltd., [2015] 18
F.C.R. 473, para. 98 (Can.) (“[W]hen an idea can be expressed in only a limited number of ways,
then its expression is not protected as the threshold of originality is not met.”).
280.
N.Y. Mercantile, 497 F.3d at 116.
281.
BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 978 F. Supp. 2d 280, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
282.
Id. at 303.
283.
Id. at 311; N.Y. Mercantile, 497 F.3d at 118.
284.
N.Y. Mercantile, 497 F.3d at 118.
285.
See SCASSA, supra note 210, at 8.
286.
See id. at 8–9.
287.
Geophysical Serv. Inc. v. EnCana Corp., 2016 ABQB 230, para. 115 (Can.).
288.
Id.
RIGHT
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sometimes referred to as basic or raw data, together with the
description of the complete recording parameters.”289 Justice Eidsvik
decided that field data constitutes a literary work as a “compilation”
and meets the “skill and judgment” test of originality that the Canadian
Supreme Court laid out in CCH Canadian Ltd. (“CCH Canada”).290
Given that originality in compilation works lies in the “selection or
arrangement of data,” copyright does not exist in the field of raw data
itself when it comes to field data.291 Here, the judge defined “processed
data” as “any product derived, generated or created from the data,
including, but not limited to any and all processed and reprocessed
data, interpretations, maps or analyses, regardless of the form or
medium on which it is displayed or stored.”292 She wrote:
[a]s for the processed data, the processors exercise skill and judgment in the decisions they make to create a usable product from the [raw] data… [t]he evidence is
clear that the processed product can be quite different depending on the skill of the
processor and that exploration companies have their favorite processors who create
the best quality product for their purposes.293

Making a distinction between raw and processed data as to the
type of “skills and judgment” exercised—with raw data, the skill and
judgment concerning “the collection, arrangement, distillation, and
compilation,” and with processed data, “the decisions [made] to create
a usable product from the field data”— Justice Eidsvik recognized
copyright in the processed data itself but excluded raw data from
copyrightability.294 Therefore, as applied in US and Canadian
jurisprudence, data that merely represents objective facts does not have
copyright protection; instead, copyright subsists in the compilation of
such data. Moreover, data processed from raw data can attract
copyright, depending on the process of its creation. In this respect, it
begs the question: given that compilations and processed data are
theoretically copyrightable, why can these works be denied protection
on the basis of how they are created?

289.
Id. at para. 47.
290.
Id. at paras. 74, 77–78; CCH Canadian Ltd. v. L. Soc’y Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R.
339, para. 16 (Can.).
291.
Geophysical Serv. Inc. v. EnCana Corp., 2016 ABQB 230, para. 77 (Can.) (“[D]ata
becomes a ‘work’ when it is compiled. One ping from a hydrophone would not suffice; it is the
collection, arrangement, distillation and compilation that creates the work.”); Copyright Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s 2 (Can.) (defining “compilation” as “a work resulting from the selection or
arrangement of literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works or parts thereof, or . . . a work resulting from the selection or arrangement of data”).
292.
Geophysical, 2016 ABQB 230 at para. 58 (Can.).
293.
Id. at para. 83.
294.
See SCASSA, supra note 210, at 10.
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As discussed in Part II, most user data is collected by AI-enabled
sensors and processed by AI-based data analytics.295 For the product of
data collection and data processing to enjoy copyright as a “work”
distinguishable from facts, it must be authored by a human.296 If a fully
automated process has generated the data without human involvement,
such data will not be covered by copyright.297 There is currently an
extensive debate about the fate of AI-generated works, where AI
generates works otherwise copyrightable but lack human authorship.298
Nevertheless, AI simply being involved in creation will not necessarily
result in a denial of copyright to the resulting work.299 In the abovementioned US and Canada cases, the data under consideration were
generated by either non-AI algorithms in settlement prices and
calculated percentages or by complex processes, such as those used to
collect underwater seismic data.300 Thus, some categories of data, such
as technical and machine data, are not necessarily excluded from
copyright simply because they are automatically collected through
sensors.
Based on the recent jurisprudence,301 user data in the form of
activity data—such as farm operation data, which originates in farmers’
295.
See supra Part II; How Big Data and Artificial Intelligence Are Transforming Business, INSIGHT (May 28, 2021), https://www.insight.com/en_US/content-and-resources/2021/howbig-data-and-artificial-intelligence-are-transforming-business.html
[https://perma.cc/7VVLF7WP].
296.
See Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[S]ome element
of human creativity must have occurred in order for the book to be copyrightable.”). The United
States Copyright Office will refuse to register a claim that lacks human authorship. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 608 (3d ed. 2021),
https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M2L-VHYE] [hereinafter COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES]; see also Pamela Samuelson, Allocating
Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 PITT. L. REV. 1186, 1224 (1986) (“[I]f there is
no human author of such a work [computer-generated works], how can any human be motivated
to create it? The copyright system assumes that society awards a set of exclusive rights to authors
for limited times in order to motivate them to be creative.”).
297.
See Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Phone Directories Co. Pty. Ltd. [2010] FCA 44 (8 February
2010) (Austl.). The High Court of Australia denied copyright protection for telephone directories
that were created by automated process, on the ground that such process lacks human authorship.
See id.
298.
Jared Vasconcellos Grubow, O.K. Computer: The Devolution of Human Creativity and
Granting Musical Copyrights to Artificially Intelligent Joint Authors, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 387, 420
(2018). (arguing that the “promotion of progress is best served by giving AIs rights and regulating
them”).
299.
See SCASSA, supra note 210, at 9–10.
300.
See Urantia Found., 114 F.3d at 956–59; Scassa, supra note 210, at 9–10.
301.
See generally Tesh W. Dagne, Embracing the Data Revolution for Development:
Rights-based Governance for Farm Data in the Context of African Indigenous Farmers, 25 J.L. SOC.
JUST. & GLOB. DEVELOP. 16 (2021) (discussing the typical legal analysis of farm data as intellectual
property).
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operations or associated activities—may be eligible for copyright
protection. The value attached to such data arises from farmers’
knowledge and practices, which in some contexts, are acquired from the
farmers’ role as custodians of a systemic body of knowledge,
accumulated experience, informal experiments, and understanding of
the environment.302 Farmers exercise their skill and judgment when
entering their operation data into a data platform or software to create
the activity data.303 Data-sharing agreements typically recognize
farmers’ rights to the same extent as recognized by law but require
farmers to grant the platform owners “a non-exclusive license to access,
use, reproduce, display, modify and prepare derivative works.”304
However, given the exploitative nature of such contracts in the face of
the existing power imbalance,305 the relevant question is: How can data
originators assert control over this data so it is not transferred to third
parties without consent? After sharing their valuable data with
platform operators, could data originators demand access to processed
data that have been mixed with technical and machine data? Current
law does not provide sufficient answers to these questions; hence, this
Article’s proposal for a new sui generis regime.
The other category of user data—machine and device data—may
have unique significance in big-data applications like farm machinery
and equipment, but its related ownership questions are not as unique.
Questions surrounding the ownership and control of machine data are
present in the automotive industry, specifically concerning smart cars,
and have motivated the EU’s proposal to recognize the rights of data
producers.306
Currently, it is uncertain who owns machine-and-device data: the
equipment manufacturer, the equipment owner, or no one. Machineand-device data is categorized as an objective representation of facts
and is therefore uncopyrightable.307 While this data is stored in cloud
302.
This is the case with the practice of agriculture by indigenous peoples and local communities. See generally id. (discussing the typical legal analysis of farm data as intellectual property).
303.
See Madeline Turland & Peter Slade, Farmers’ Willingness to Participate in a Big
Data Platform, 36 AGRIBUSINESS 20, 20–22 (2019).
304.
See, e.g., Climate FieldView Terms of Service, supra note 143.
305.
See generally van der Burg et al., supra note 4 (discussing how the European Union
encourages transparency in using agricultural data via contracts).
306.
See P.B. HUGENHOLTZ, DATA PROPERTY: UNWELCOME GUEST IN THE HOUSE OF IP 1
(2017),
https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/16856245/Data_property_Muenster.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EVJ3-TLV3] (noting that the EU’s calls for the introduction of a novel property
right in data are in response to demands from the automotive industry).
307.
See Jeffrey Johnson, What Works Cannot Be Copyright Protected?, FREE ADVICE,
https://www.freeadvice.com/legal/what-works-cannot-be-copyright-protected/
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storage or on a computer hard drive, such storage does not give rise to
copyright protection available to compilations because the automatic
collection and arrangement of machine-and-device data is purely
mechanical.308 In typical terms of use agreements, equipment users
such as farmers can opt out of sharing machine data.309 However, users
can also be discouraged from opting out of data sharing. Opting out may
mean that software updates and upgrades are not received. Often,
equipment manufacturers embed licensed onboard software that
requires upgrades and exclusive servicing by the manufacturer’s
affiliates contingent on data sharing.310
In addition, equipment manufacturers often secure themselves as
the de facto owners of machine data by controlling access to the data
through proprietary software, which collects, stores, and transmits the
data.311 As John Deere stated in a 2015 filing with the US Copyright
Office, the farmers acquired “an implied license” to operate their
tractors and had no right to access such software.312 Moreover, this
software often incorporates barriers as TPMs.313 The Canadian
Copyright Act and the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
include anticircumvention provisions that prohibit circumventing
TPMs to access data without the permission of the software owner.314
These mechanisms curtail users’ ability to access diagnostic data for
[https://perma.cc/R3FK-ZJNG] (July 16, 2021); see also Jack Vaughan, Machine Data, TECHTARGET,
https://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/machine-data
[https://perma.cc/66CW-GRW8] (last updated Dec. 2014) (defining and providing examples of
machine data).
308.
See COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 296, at §§ 727–
727.3.
309.
See JOHN DEERE, JOHN DEERE PRIVACY POLICY ON DATA NOTICE 2 (2022),
https://www.deere.com/assets/pdfs/common/privacy-and-data/mjd-privacy-notice/mjd-privacy-notice_r2_5.25.18_en_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FRL-225V] (“To remove dealer access to Machine
Data from machines in your account you must do both of the following: remove Service ADVISOR™
Remote access for each machine from the Terminal Settings tab in the Operations Center and
remove access to machine notifications and advisors from the Partner Access tab in Operations
Center.”).
310.
AUSTL. FARM INST., THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DIGITAL AGRICULTURE AND BIG DATA FOR
AUSTRALIAN
AGRICULTURE
44
(2016),
https://www.crdc.com.au/sites/default/files/pdf/Big_Data_Report_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/P94P-3RLE].
311.
See Zhang, supra note 2, at 316.
312.
John Deere, Long Comment Regarding a Proposed Exemption Under
17
U.S.C.
1201,
at
6
(2015),
https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments032715/class%2021/John_Deere_Class21_1201_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/MFR3-4PBF].
313.
See generally Ian R Kerr, Alana Maurushat & Christian S. Tacit, Technical Protection
Measures: Tilting at Copyright’s Windmill, 34 OTTAWA L. REV. 7 (2003) (providing an overview of
technological protection measures).
314.
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s 41.1(1) (Can.) (“No person shall circumvent a
technological protection measure. . . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (“[N]o person shall circumvent a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”).
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repairing and maintaining equipment, such as tractors and farm
implements.
Given the inaccessibility of the nearest urban centers where a
tractor dealer could service their equipment, farmers have a unique
capacity for self-reliance; they depend on their own ability, or the
abilities of their neighbors, to service and maintain their equipment.315
In consideration of this, the US Copyright Office issued a
recommendation in 2015 to exempt the software embedded in motorized
vehicles from the DMCA to save farmers from liability.316 Nevertheless,
equipment manufacturers, such as John Deere, have begun to
incorporate a license agreement prohibiting new tractor owners from
tampering with the “security measures” in embedded software,
contractually bypassing the regulatory exemption and forcing farmers
to seek repairs from licensed John Deere dealers.317
As a result, in a highly publicized move, farmers started to “hack
their tractors” to repair their equipment through “software [that] is
cracked in Eastern European countries such as Poland and Ukraine
and then sold back to farmers in the United States.”318 Farmers were
able to purchase the necessary diagnostic tools and cables to utilize the
software in making repairs.319 Others resorted to buying forty-year-old
tractors that still function and are more repairable than new models.320
The problem fueled a “right-to-repair” movement, which resulted in the
introduction of legislation in twenty states and a call by two Democratic
315.
One in Five Americans Live in Rural Areas, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2017/08/rural-america.html#:~:text=One%20in%20Five%20Americans%20Live%20in%20Rural%20Areas&text=About%2060%20million%20people%2C%20or,different%20things%20to%20different%20people [https://perma.cc/U86J-WEXB] (noting that rural areas comprise 97 percent of US
land mass with roughly 19 percent of the population, while urban centers make up only 3 percent
of the US land mass but are home to more than 80 percent of the population).
316.
See MARIA A. PALLANTE, REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS & DIR., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., SECTION 1201 RULEMAKING: SIXTH TRIENNIAL PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE EXEMPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION 1 (2015), https://cdn.loc.gov/copyright/1201/2015/registers-recommendation.pdf [https://perma.cc/33MG-GSVN].
317.
See JOHN DEERE, LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR JOHN DEERE EMBEDDED
SOFTWARE 1 (2021), https://www.deere.com/assets/pdfs/common/privacy-and-data/docs/agreement_pdfs/english/2016-10-28-Embedded-Software-EULA.pdf [https://perma.cc/258Z-BS84].
318.
Jason Koebler, Why American Farmers Are Hacking Their Tractors with Ukrainian
Firmware, VICE (Mar. 21, 2017, 3:17 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/xykkkd/why-americanfarmers-are-hacking-their-tractors-with-ukrainian-firmware [https://perma.cc/A6VF-DXNQ].
319.
Stef Schrader, Farmers Are Having to Hack Their Own Tractors Just to Make
Repairs, DRIVE (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.thedrive.com/news/39158/farmers-are-having-to-hacktheir-own-tractors-just-to-make-repairs [https://perma.cc/3SEQ-QP4Q].
320.
Matthew Gault, Farmers Are Buying 40-Year-Old Tractors Because They’re Actually
Repairable, VICE (Jan. 7, 2020, 9:57 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/bvgx9w/farmers-arebuying-40-year-old-tractors-because-theyre-actually-repairable [https://perma.cc/8CQ9-57KZ].
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presidential candidates (Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders) for
federal legislation to give farmers the right to fix their own tractors and
equipment.321 In early July 2021, President Biden issued an executive
order, which requires equipment and device manufacturers to publicly
post the diagnostic tools and documentation (containing machine-anddevice data) for technology users to use to fix products when they
break.322 In Canada, a right to repair bill was introduced by the Ontario
legislature but voted down.323 Moreover, while similar legislation was
introduced in Quebec, a private members bill—Bill C-272, which
proposes that a “right of repair” be added to section 41 of the Copyright
Act—was voted on unanimously upon second reading on June 2,
2021.324
Users originate most types of data, whether as technical data
containing vital information about the farm, livestock, and the human
body, inter alia, or as activity data, such as farm operation data that
reveals farmers’ know-how in the practice and management of
agriculture.325 As equipment, machines, and devices become more
sophisticated, the incorporation of IoT technology facilitates the
production of a vast amount of machine and device data. However,
copyright would not extend to technical or machine-and-device data.326
Even though copyright could subsist over activity data, contractual
stipulations bypass the practical means of asserting this right.327
Nevertheless, once shared with data collectors, user data becomes
a subject of appropriation through forms of ownership and technical
control.328 The discussion in this Section has shown how such control
presents an obstacle to technology users’ self-reliance and independence
by denying them access to machine data. Thus, public policy needs to
321.
Matthew Gault, Bernie Sanders Calls for a National Right-to-Repair Law for
Farmers, VICE (May. 5, 2019, 4:48 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/8xzqmp/bernie-sanderscalls-for-a-national-right-to-repair-law-for-farmers [https://perma.cc/JH5V-28NG].
322.
Erin Carson, FTC Votes to Fight Illegal Restrictions on Right to Repair, CNET (July
22, 2021, 7:30 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/politics/ftc-votes-to-fight-illegal-restrictions-onright-to-repair/ [https://perma.cc/J37E-42XR].
323.
Shruti Shekar, Right to Repair Bill Failed, but Liberal Ontario MPP Wants to
Push to Take It Federally, MOBILESYRUP (May 3, 2019, 3:58 PM), https://mobilesyrup.com/2019/05/03/michael-coteau-right-repair-bill/ [https://perma.cc/P2L4-RAAZ].
324.
Anthony Rosborough, A Canadian Right to Repair Bill Sees 330-0 Vote, as Measure
Clears Key Hurdle, REPAIR.ORG (June 3, 2021), https://www.repair.org/blog/2021/6/3/a-canadianright-to-repair-bill-sees-330-0-vote-as-measure-clears-key-hurdle [https://perma.cc/X68S-Y2R4].
325.
Jakku et al., supra note 77, at 1–2.
326.
SETH GREENSTEIN & DAVID GOLDEN, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR COPYRIGHT AND PRIVACY 3–18 (2018), https://constantinecannon.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/IoT-Presentation-Greenstein-Golden-20180418.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P3X-TRH4].
327.
See discussion supra Section V.A.
328.
Climate FieldView Terms of Service, supra note 143.
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guarantee users access to machine-and-device data while empowering
them to maintain control over activity data. Furthermore, control over
technical data, such as agronomic data, is paramount given the
detrimental effect of potentially disclosing such data to third parties.
The discussion thus far demonstrates a gap in recognizing the value
generated by data for its originators.
In contrast, such data sometimes becomes the subject of
copyright by data collectors and processors, either as a compilation or
in the form of processed data.329 This trend is exacerbated in
circumstances where copyright is clearly asserted in user data that is
de-identified and aggregated. The following discussion uncovers such
scenarios.
ii. Copyrightability of Aggregated Data
As shown in the above discussion, contractual stipulations
between data originators and data collectors often assign ownership of
“aggregated or anonymized data” to data collectors.330 The question
here is whether there is any basis in law underlying such a contractual
claim of ownership of aggregated user data. The assertion of ownership
over such data is based on the claim that it constitutes independent
work once it is processed and generated by a computer software
system.331 Once user data is shared with data collectors and processed
with data analytics and computer-software systems, will copyright
subsist over the data and result in collectors’ copyright ownership of
such data?
The answer to this question will depend on the processing that
goes into the data, which determines whether a copyright may subsist
either as a “compilation” or a data form. In both cases, illustrated in the
329.
Data Collections and Copyright, FED’N UNIV. AUSTL., https://federation.edu.au/library/about-the-library/copyright/A-Z-copyright-guide/data-collections-and-copyright
[https://perma.cc/YCJ4-XQMU] (last visited Mar. 2, 2022).
330.
See, e.g., Climate FieldView Terms of Service, supra note 143 (“We own any works we
generate (“Climate Generated Works”), including data, tools, analyses, results, estimates,
prescriptions, recommendations and other information generated, published, displayed,
transmitted or made available to you in or by the FieldView Services . . . whether or not the
Climate Generated Works are related to personal data, Customer Farm Data or Third Party. Climate Generated Works include “Aggregated or Anonymized Information,” which is
information that has been aggregated or anonymized such that it is not personally identifiable to
you by a person using reasonable skills. Aggregated or Anonymized Information is not considered
Customer Farm Data.”).
331.
See, e.g., AGWORLD, AGWORLD MASTER SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENT 5 (2020), https://agworld-marketing.s3.amazonaws.com/MSA-2020-02-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQB6-4FP5] (“We
own and will hold copyright in the particular formats and manner of presentation We use to display and present Your Data.”).
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above discussion, the test relies on whether the process of creating the
compilation, or data, satisfies originality, with both tests distinguishing
between facts, data, and the doctrine of merger fulfilled.332 The process
of creating or compiling the data must also involve human
authorship.333 The question of when originality exists in the compilation
of aggregated data was most recently addressed by Canada’s Federal
Court of Appeal in Toronto Real Estate Board (TREB) v. Commissioner
of Competition,334 which agreed with the earlier ruling of the
Competition Tribunal in which:
The Tribunal considered a number of criteria relevant to the determination of originality (paragraphs 737-738 and 740-745). Those included the process of data entry
and its “almost instantaneous” appearance in the database. It found that “TREB’s
specific compilation of data from real estate listings amounts to a mechanical exercise” (TR at para. 740). We find, on these facts, that the originality threshold was
not met.335

In this case, TREB operates a database system that contains
property information, including addresses, price lists, and photographs
of real estate listings.336 Information is added to the database on an
ongoing basis by real estate brokers, who contribute data each time a
property is listed with them.337 Members of TREB receive full access to
the database via an electronic feed.338 They may make these data
available through their websites.339 Simultaneously, some data
available in the database are not distributed via the data feed; TREB
allows members to share such data by fax, email, or telephone,
restricting the sharing of some of the data through “virtual office”
websites, which are accessible to clients.340
TREB claimed that its restriction consisted only of enforcing its
copyright interest in its compiled database.341 This claim was dismissed
because the compilation failed to meet the tests of originality, as quoted
above.342 Besides originality, the Federal Court of Appeal offered
certain guidelines relevant for assessing the existence of copyright over

332.
333.
334.
(Can.).
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

See discussion supra Section VI.B.i.
See discussion supra Section VI.B.i.
Toronto Real Estate Bd. v. Comm’r of Competition, [2018] 3 F.C.R. 563, paras. 185–88
Id. at para. 194.
Id. at para. 5.
Id.
Id. at para. 2.
Id.
Id. at para. 6.
See id. at para 2.
See id. at paras. 194–95.

2022]

WHERE COPYRIGHT MEETS PRIVACY

731

aggregated agricultural data.343 Most relevant, the court stated that
while “TREB’s contracts with third parties refer to its copyright, . . .
that does not amount to proving the degree of skill, judgment or labor
needed to show originality and to satisfy the copyright requirements.”344
In user data, contractual stipulations often refer to aggregated data
generated by software and computer systems as copyrightable works.345
However, though contractually binding to the user, such provisions in
themselves do not prove originality under copyright.346
This Canadian jurisprudence on originality requirements in the
compilation of aggregated data is consistent with US jurisprudence.347
In a decision rendered in the wake of the US Supreme Court decision in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, which
held that copyright does not subsist in the information contained in a
phone directory,348 the Second Circuit found copyright in a compendium
of projections of used car valuations.349
Often, contractual provisions for data sharing provide for the
sweeping assertion of copyrights over aggregated agricultural data
generated by software and computer systems.350 In relation to the
dispute in which a group of American chicken farmers brought class
actions in consideration of the potential harm posed by improperly
sharing agricultural data,351 Agri Stats, the operator of the agricultural
data-sharing app, regarded the data collected from farmers as the
company’s “confidential and proprietary information.”352 As a matter of
business practice, TPs, data intermediaries, and data platforms make
such data accessible to anyone through subscription fees.353 Thus,
technology users are forced to accept “click-through licenses” to gain

343.
Id. at paras. 187–95.
344.
Id. at para. 195.
345.
For example, Climate FieldView uses the copyright word “works” in referring to its
software-generated content. Climate FieldView Terms of Service, supra note 143 (“We own any
works we generate (“Climate Generated Works”), including data.”).
346.
Toronto Real Estate Bd., [2018] 3 F.C.R. 563 at para. 196 (Can.).
347.
Id. at para. 184.
348.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363–64 (1991).
349.
CCC Info. Servs. v. MacLean Hunter Mkt. Reps., Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1994);
see also Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 140–42 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
compilation of real estate ownership data superimposed on maps was protectible because the compiler made independent choices “to select information from numerous and sometimes conflicting
sources” such as various public records and combined the data onto “an effective pictorial expression”).
350.
Wiseman et al., supra note 131, at 8.
351.
See Douglas, supra note 114.
352.
Leonard, supra note 109.
353.
See id.
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access to the data.354 Consequently, data collectors, processors, and
aggregators effectively exercise copyright ownership over the
aggregated data.
Given that recent jurisprudential developments provide the
possibility for copyright claims to processed data and compilation of raw
data,355 there are circumstances where copyright may indeed exist over
aggregated data. For ATPs, data intermediaries, and data platforms,
for example, the assertion of rights over agricultural data, whether
through contracts or copyright, relies on the ground that such data, once
collected and aggregated, lies outside the scope of “personal data”—the
ownership of which is often clearly stipulated in contracts as belonging
to farmers.356 In addition to a narrow scope of recognition of “personal
data” in the agreements,357 legal protection under privacy regimes is
sidestepped in aggregated data because such data are de-identified.358
Setting aside the failure of de-identification techniques and the
possibility of re-identification through advanced processing,359
aggregated data may still be considered “relating to” farmers’ personal
data and yet be owned by data collectors.360
As noted above, in “privative” copyright jurisprudence, there is a
basis for recognizing copyright-based privacy rights to objects that do
not meet the statutory requirements of original expression.361 Thus,
even when user data may be excluded from the scope of copyright, there
is a jurisprudential basis for recognizing originators’ rights in data that
could similarly be implemented in other legislation that is modeled on
copyright.362
354.
William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV.
1203, 1245 (1998).
355.
See supra notes 335–50 and accompanying text.
356.
See supra text accompanying notes 215–17.
357.
See discussion supra Section V.B.
358.
See supra text accompanying note 200.
359.
See Yves-Alexandre De Montjoye, Laura Radaellivivek, Kumar Singhand & Alex
“Sandy” Pentland, Unique in the Shopping Mall: On the Reidentifiability of Credit Card Metadata,
347 SCI. 536, 537 (2015).
360.
For a discussion of when agricultural data may be “relating to” farmers in
discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 193–95. See also Climate FieldView Terms of Service, supra note 143 (“We own any works we generate (“Climate Generated Works”), including data
. . . whether or not the Climate Generated Works are related to personal data, Customer Farm
Data or Third Party.”).
361.
See supra text accompanying notes 248–53.
362.
See supra text accompanying notes 248–53; Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”?
Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 338, 383 (1992) (arguing that works of information excluded from the 1976
Copyright Statute following the tests of originality adopted in Feist should be covered by an
anticopying statute that departs in significant ways from the traditional copyright scheme).
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In what ways could a legal relationship between originators of
either processed or aggregated data and data collectors and processors
who enjoy ownership over such data be established? This Article
advances the argument that even though user data rarely meets
copyright law’s statutory criteria, such as the originality test, their
incorporation in aggregated and processed datasets should nonetheless
lead to the creation of a “joint authorship” type relationship over such
data that has become subject to copyright, entitling data originators to
certain rights.363 The following discussion elaborates on this argument
in light of the doctrine of joint authorship, which makes it suitable for
recognizing data originators’ contribution of user data to “works” that
data collectors and processors hold under copyright.
C. Joint Authorship as a Basis of Relationship
In its origin, copyright assigns authorship to the individual
under the construct of the author’s solitary, romantic genius.364
However, conceived in individualistic and solitary terms, the
assumption underlying the definition of author under copyright law did
not consider the complex process of creation, which depends on a
multiplicity of production methods.365 As Professor Chon notes, “the
dual effects of digitization and networking” have exposed the limits of
what is considered work and who the author is under traditional
copyright principles.366 As discussed above, the evolving jurisprudence
has opened doors to the possibility of data copyrightability, particularly
regarding processed data in the form of aggregated data as “works.”367
For a legal framework to enable proper data governance, which
recognizes originators’ contribution to such “work” under the normative
model of privative copyright, the doctrine of joint authorship may be
invoked as providing the normative basis to justify certain authorial
rights.368
Notably, copyright rules relating to joint authorship were
developed entirely in an incremental, common-law fashion until the

363.
See discussion infra Section VI.C.
364.
See Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: Metamorphosis of “Authorship”, 1991
DUKE L.J. 455, 462–63 (1991); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and
Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the “Author”, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 426
(1984).
365.
See Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art,
Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 7 OR. L. Rev. 257, 264 (1996).
366.
Id. at 258.
367.
See discussion supra Section VI.B.i.
368.
Balganesh, supra note 227, at 22–23.
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passing of the US Copyright Act of 1976, which, for the first time, dealt
with joint authorship through the definition of “joint work.”369 In
accordance with the Copyright Act, works produced through
collaboration become “joint works,” and so the question often arises of
what contribution from a putative author qualifies as a work of joint
authorship.370 Despite variation in the wording of the statutes and
judicial tests—which later developed in both the United States and
Canada—joint authorship arises if there is (i) collaboration between the
authors in furtherance of a common design to create the work, or (ii)
from each a significant original contribution to the expression of the
work, consisting of “inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole” (or in Canada “not distinct” from the other’s contribution).371 In
the United States, there is also a statutory requirement of “intention,”
which the courts have construed as requiring the putative joint authors
to have “collaborative intent,”372 “shared . . . intent,”373 or “intent to
create a joint work.”374
Although the determination of joint authorship based on the
above requirements has made the doctrine hazy in “scenarios where one
collaborator’s contributions are inextricably tied to those of another,”
369.
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
101) (“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”). While the first
US copyright statute, the Copyright Act of 1790, uses the phrase “author or authors” in multiple
places, it made no special allowances for joint authorship, nor did it specify how such joint authorship was to be determined. See Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat 124 (1790) (repealed 1831). The Copyright Act of 1909 focused entirely on a singular “author” throughout. See
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976); Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1685 n.10 (2014). In Canada, a “work
of joint authorship” is “a work produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the
contribution of one author is not distinct from the contribution of the other author or authors.”
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s 2 (Can.).
370.
See Elena Cooper, Joint Authorship in Comparative Perspective: Levy v. Rutley and
Divergence Between the UK and USA, 62 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 245, 247 (2015); David Vaver,
Recent Copyright Law Developments: More Reform?, 22 INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 1 (2010).
371.
17 U.S.C. § 101; Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s 2 (Can.); see Vaver, supra note
371, at 2–3.
372.
17 U.S.C. § 101; e.g., Eckert v. Hurley Chi. Co., Inc., 638 F. Supp. 699, 704 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
373.
E.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000); Ulloa v. Universal
Music & Video Distrib. Corp.,
303 F. Supp. 2d 409, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 509 (2d Cir.
1991)).
374.
E.g., Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir.
2009) (citing Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994));
Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1327 (2d Cir. 1989) (Pierce, J., concurring); Papa’s-June
Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Childress, 945 F.2d at 507–
08).
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the raison d’être for the requirement of intention can be replaced by a
“collaborative impulse.”375 In such circumstances, there arises what is
referred to as “unplanned co-authorship [sic].”376 In this context, under
both Canadian and US law, what matters for the finding of joint
authorship is only that the putative co-authors submit contributions
that entitle each of them to be classed as authors.377
Most US cases follow the so-called “Goldstein standard,” which
affirms that each author should make an independently copyrightable
contribution to be eligible for joint authorship in work.378 However, a
minority of cases have adopted what has come to be called “Nimmer’s
view of authorship,” which requires a putative co-author merely to
demonstrate that they made a “non-de minimis contribution” to the
joint work, even though that contribution may not be independently
copyrightable.379 Goldstein’s interpretation of “authorship” relies on the
argument that because work requires copyrightability to be a work “of
authorship,” so too must a creator of a joint work contribute something
copyrightable to be considered as an author.380 Thus, the definition of
joint authorship is inevitably linked to the individualism that animates
the modern concept of an author.
However, there is support for the proposition that each author
of a joint work need not contribute copyrightable work. First, the
construing joint authorship as requiring each putative author to
contribute independently copyrightable works “form(s) part of a narrow

375.
See Balganesh, supra note 370, at 1689.
376.
Id.
377.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more authors with
the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole.”) (emphasis added); Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s 2 (Can.) (“[W]ork of joint
authorship means a work produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the
contribution of one author is not distinct from the contribution of the other author or authors[.]”)
(emphasis added).
378.
PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 248 (2d ed.
2010) (“[F]or a work to qualify as a joint or collaborative work and a contributor to qualify as a
coauthor, each contributor must have brough creative expression to the work.”).
379.
E.g., Words & Data, Inc. v. GTE Commc’ns Servs., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 570, 575 (W.D.
Mo. 1991) (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.07 (2021))
(“It would seem, however, that each such contribution must, in any event, be more than de minimis. That is, more than a word or line must be added by one who claims to be a joint
author.”); Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658–59 (7th Cir 2004); see also H.R. Rep. No.
94-1476, at 120 (1976) (“The touchstone [of coownership of joint works] is the intention, at the time
the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit,
although the parts themselves may be either ‘inseparable’ . . . or ‘interdependent’ . . . .”).
380.
See Norbert F. Kugele, How Much Does It Take: Copyrightability as a Minimum
Standard for Determining Joint Authorship, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 809, 819–20 (1991).
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view of joint works taken by courts under the [1976] Copyright Act.”381
Each joint author’s requirement to make an independently
copyrightable contribution does not have deeper judicial roots, as it is
not found in any cases decided under the Copyright Act 1909.382 Instead,
the courts have imposed the requirement, beginning with the standard
set by the Second Circuit in Childress v. Taylor.383
Besides, there is no statutory language to support the view that
originality equals authorship, either in joint works or works in general.
Section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines a joint work simply as “a
work prepared by two or more authors” without reference to the nature
of the required contribution.384 In contrast, section 102(a) sets forth the
standards for copyrightable subject matter, with the wording:
“[c]opyright subsists in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship. . . .”385 Although the phrase “original works of authorship”
appears in several portions of the statute, this phrase is notably absent
in the “joint works” section.386 While a bill to insert the word “original”
into the definition of joint works—which would thus require each joint
author make an original contribution—it was never reported out of
committee.387 It has also been argued that the requirement of
originality cannot apply to all uses of the term “author” in the 1976
Copyright Act since an employer, as an author of a work created for
hire, need not have supplied any of the originality itself.388
As a result, non-original expressions could be authored within
the meaning of the 1976 Copyright Act, although such expressions do
not attract copyright protection as works under the Copyright
statute.389 In his article on the definition of an author for copyright
purposes, with respect to the US Constitution’s reference to “authors,”
Versteeg observes that “[t]he present law [Copyright Act] does not

381.
Laura G. Lape, A Narrow View of Creative Cooperation: The Current State of Joint
Work Doctrine, 61 ALB. L. REV. 43, 84 (1997).
382.
See, e.g., Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267
(2d Cir. 1944), modified, 140 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1944); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music
Co., 221 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir. 1955); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Columbia Graphophone Co., 258 F. 72,
75 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
383.
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991). For an analysis of the statutory
basis for the standard in Childress, see Michael B. Landau, Joint Works Under United States Copyright Law: Judicial Legislation Through Statutory Misinterpretation, 54 IDEA 157, 213–18
(2014).
384.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
385.
Id. at § 102(a).
386.
Id. at §§ 101, 201(a), 302(b).
387.
S. 1253, 101st Cong. (1989).
388.
Lape, supra note 382, at 68; see Landau, supra note 384, at 216.
389.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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protect as much subject matter as the constitutional grant [to authors]
could permit.”390 The contributions of non-original expressions by an
author—even though they do not entitle her to be a joint author under
copyright because of the prevailing judicial approach—ought
nonetheless result in some level of recognition under a sui generis
statute.
As revealed in the above discussion, user data that has become
part of aggregated data, and hence has become copyrightable processed
data, could meet the standard of “original expression” as a
copyrightable criterion.391 However, it is unlikely that raw user data,
except perhaps for activity data, such as farm operation data, meets the
standard set under Feist and CCH Canada.392 These categories of data
do not meet the copyright’s statutory standards of originality as
evincing a “modicum of creativity” or “the exercise of skills and
judgment” under either US or Canadian standards, respectively, in
order to have a standalone right.393 Nevertheless, user data generated
in the form of machine and device data, activity data, or technical data
can be analogized to what Professor Ginsburg characterizes as “low
authorship works” or “sweat works,” which she asserts should be
protected.394 Criticizing the lack of protection for “works at once high in
commercial value but low in personal authorship” under the prevailing
approach that requires “originality,” Ginsburg proposes protection for
information works “[where] the worth of the work lies in the
information, rather than in the form imposed [by copyright]” through a
legislated compulsory licensing regime affording the first compiler
compensation.395
The argument in this Article is not that user data should be
covered by copyright, either independently or as part of a joint work.
However, this discussion demonstrates that a sui generis legislative
framework for user data of diverse categories could be modeled under
copyright law, given the normative basis in privative claims and
recognition of the contribution of non-copyrightable works of authors
under joint authorship doctrine. Therefore, in a data-governance
framework that defines the relationship between technology users and
390.
Russ Versteeg, Defining “Author” for Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 1323,
1324 (1996).
391.
See discussion supra Section VI.B.i.
392.
See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. L. Soc’y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 341 (Can.);
Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
393.
See CCH Canadian, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 352 (Can.); Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
394.
Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of
Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1927–29 (1990).
395.
Id. at 1866, 1869, 1916.
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data originators on the one hand and data collectors and processors on
the other, copyright law could provide a model for recognizing users’
contributions as sources of data. Thus, the next question that presents
itself is: What is the nature and scope of the rights that should be
recognized in a legislative intervention on behalf of data originators?
VII. NATURE AND CONTENT OF RIGHTS IN POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE
INTERVENTION TO SUPPORT DATA ORIGINATORS
The proposed sui generis framework would be best modeled on
copyright law because the nature of rights to be included is best
structured as a private law claim. Being that such a framework has
normative roots in copyright does not suggest that data originators
acquire ownership rights similar to an actual joint owner. Instead, just
like copyright operates by granting creators a private cause of action for
certain kinds of unauthorized use of their works,396 data originators
should be given specific rights that could be enforced through private
rights of action, imitating those granted by copyright.
The proposed framework recognizes that once user data has
been shared with data collectors and aggregated with a mix of different
data categories, its potential is best maximized by treating it as a
resource from which insights can be derived and shared. User data,
such as agricultural data, are a non-rivalrous good that multiple parties
can consume without diminishing the initial value enjoyed by other
users of that data.397 As such, user data are generally worth more to
everyone (including those who generated them) when shared than when
analyzed in silos.398 While deciding whether or not to share data
remains with the data originator, legal principles make “ownership” of
user data challenging to define.399 Such ownership framework mainly
reinforces and strengthens data collectors’ and data processors’ claims
for monopoly over data. Hence, the content of the originators’ claims to
user data is best defined as a right to access and maintain control.
With such rights, data originators can utilize data in their
production and marketing decisions regarding their agricultural

396.
See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law:
Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1667–69 (2012) (discussing how
copyright law borrows a normative, bipolar entitlement structure from elsewhere in private law).
397.
Noah J. Miller, Terry W. Griffin, Paul Goeringer, Ashley Ellixson & Alekshan
Shanoyan, Estimating Value, Damages, and Remedies When Farm Data are Misappropriated,
CHOICES, Jan. 31, 2019, at 2.
398.
See id. at 3.
399.
See Charles I. Jones & Christopher Tonetti, Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data,
110 AM. ECON. REV. 2819, 2822 (2020).
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activity. Also, the right to control data would enable data originators to
ensure that the data they willingly share with TPs, data platforms, and
data intermediaries are not shared with third parties without the
originators’ consent. Furthermore, if the data are transferred without
their consent, originators would have a cause of action irrespective of
what the data-sharing contract may provide.
The lack of a mechanism to ensure such access and control over
data brings issues of trust and uncertainty regarding data and the
outcome of related analysis in the age of big data.400 The expansive
rights granted to data aggregators under users’ contractual
relationships should be limited to protect technology users, as the
weaker contracting parties, through mandatory rules of law. Such
mandatory rules have long been standard in all jurisdictions to protect
groups of individuals who are recognized as the weaker parties in their
contracting relationships with others (e.g., employees and tenants).401
The above discussion shows the need to guarantee the data originator’s
claim for access to and control over user data through a legal
framework, containing rules of mandatory law that do not leave room
for contractual deviation from the rules laid down within it. Such a
guarantee should recognize originators’ rights (entitlement) to user
data. Given the normative roots for such a legal framework in copyright
law, as discussed above, it is recommended that such a legal framework
be adopted at the federal level in both the United States and Canada.
In defining the content of rights, the relationship of data originators
to user data can be characterized both as authorial—namely, as
contributors to what is held under copyright—and as users in
implementing data to effectively engage in the digital economy, such as
through digital agriculture. Thus, at a minimum, a potential sui generis
legislative framework modeled on copyright for user data ought to
recognize two rights that flow from these two characterizations in this
respective order: the right to control disclosure and the right of access.
A. Right to Control Disclosure
The first and most crucial right that ought to be recognized for
proper governance of user data and which flows directly from
recognizing data originators as contributors to data under proprietary
control is the right to control disclosure. As noted earlier, the right of
disclosure is embedded in the common-law right of first publication of
400.
See Gullo et al., supra note 45.
401.
Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472,
491–93 (1980) (advancing the principle of “paretianism,” which seeks to balance libertarian and
egalitarian impulses in contracting).

740

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 24:4:675

unpublished works, subsumed under the exclusive right of public
distribution under the US Copyright Act of 1976.402 Given the criteria
of this Act, which exclude non-original expressions from the scope of
protection, a suitable sui generis regime for user data ought to codify
the right in the form of control over the disclosure of data generated by
originators.403 To fully understand the scope of rights that technology
users, such as farmers, can acquire by recognizing rights that simulate
the right of disclosure, it is necessary to illuminate how the right of
disclosure works in those civil law jurisdictions that recognize it in their
copyright legislation.
The right of disclosure is a bundle of rights within the ambit of
moral rights, broadly recognized in civil law jurisdictions (along with
attribution, integrity, and withdrawal rights).404 Moral rights are
characterized as inherent rights of the author, meaning that they
belong to those who actually created the work in question and not those
who own copyright upon assignment.405 The right of disclosure enables
the holders to control the publication of their works, empowering them
with the ultimate decision over whether a work is complete and should
be made public.406 The similar right of first publication, represented in
the Copyright Act of 1976 through the right of public distribution,
“failed to account for the alienability of the rights,” thereby morphing
“into an unrecognizable and unjustifiable right that may be asserted
regardless of the identity of the person asserting it.”407 However, the
right of disclosure is an inalienable right that “recognizes the author as
the ultimate judge of when and under what conditions a work can be
disseminated.”408 Therein lies the unique significance of the right of
disclosure: the author can impose conditions on how a work is
disseminated, and such a right cannot be transferred through
contractual arrangements.

402.
See Keller, supra note 232, at 26.
403.
See Ginsburg, supra note 363, at 381.
404.
See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 359
(2006); cf. Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries,
19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 213–17 (1995) (comparing different approaches to moral rights
among western European countries).
405.
ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 448 (5th ed. 2012) (“[T]he person claiming the moral right
typically no longer own the work itself or the copyright. The claim is thus based on a different,
inherent right that is part of authorship itself.”).
406.
See Kathryn A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor Before
Free Speech?, 11 U. MIA. ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 211, 216 (1994).
407.
Keller, supra note 232, at 36.
408.
Lior Zemer, Moral Rights: Limited Edition, 91 B.U.L. REV. 1519, 1524 n.26 (2011).
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In modeling data governance for user data through the right of
disclosure, data originators ought to retain the right to decide what data
are disclosed to third parties and how, after sharing contractual data
with a TP, data intermediary, or data platform. Given the possibility of
aggregated user data being tied back to an individual or their farm, for
example, such right of disclosure is essential to address data
originators’ fears and concerns in data sharing. Recognizing the right
of disclosure would also help prevent the potential abuse of power that
is enabled by data-sharing practices, such as those that have arisen in
class actions in the US poultry industry.409 The right of disclosure
resembles the right to control personal data in privacy regimes.410
However, it fills the void created in such regimes because user data
cannot qualify as “personal data,” even when “relating to” a particular
individual or to the means of their economic dependence, such as the
farm.411
B. Right of Access as a Counterbalance to Access-Right
Access-right is a new right that has emerged in digital copyright
jurisprudence and scholarship over the last two decades.412 “Accessright” is described as the copyright owners’ “right to control the manner
in which members of the public apprehend the work. . . [through] a right
against the gaining of unauthorized access.”413 Although this right was
explicitly introduced by the DMCA in 1998 and became an integral part
of copyright in the wake of the availability of mass-copying devices,414
Professor Ginsburg states that it was “implicit in the reproduction and
distribution rights under copyright” law in earlier times but has evolved
to extend to new forms of exploitation in the digital age.415

409.
See supra notes 109–14 and accompanying text.
410.
See discussion supra Section VI.A.
411.
See supra notes 193–95 and accompanying text.
412.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Popernik, The Creation of an “Access Right” in the Ninth
Circuit’s Digital Copyright Jurisprudence, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 697, 719–22 (2013); Laura N.
Gasaway, The New Access Right and Its Impact on Libraries and Library Users, 10 U. GA. J. INTELL. PROP. L. 269, 269 (2003). See generally ZOHAR EFRONI, ACCESS-RIGHT: THE FUTURE OF DIGITAL COPYRIGHT LAW (2011) (presenting in detail a positive and normative analysis of accessright).
413.
Thomas Heide, Copyright in the EU and U.S.: What “Access-Right”?, 48 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 363, 364–65 (2001).
414.
See id. at 363.
415.
Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an
Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, in US INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 49 n.27
(Hugh C. Hansen ed., 2006).
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The content of access-right, distinguishable from “copy”-right,416
has been confirmed in a series of cases as a new cause of action to
protect works from unauthorized circumvention of virtual locks and
keys (collectively referred to as TPMs).417 This right has empowered
technology companies to contractually customize a set of entitlements
to access or use their software in whatever ways the companies think
best.418 Furthermore, such a mechanism is protected with a copyrightbased cause of action, which avoids analyzing whether copyright
infringement has occurred.419 As demonstrated in the above discussion,
such exercise of an access-right by ATPs, like John Deere, has led to the
growing “right to repair” movement in the United States and Canada,
which entitles farmers to access machine-diagnostic data.420
As a self-standing cause of action, access-right is sometimes
construed as not requiring the existence of underlying copyright.421
Moreover, exceptions to copyright (such as fair use) do not guarantee
access to a work to carry out a permitted act under copyright law.422 In
this respect, access-right is juxtaposed with the right to access, which
416.
Id. at 42.
417.
See, e.g., MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 943–52 (9th Cir. 2010); Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011). The statutory basis for the
protection of TPMs in the United States is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which provides
that “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a
work protected under this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). In Canada, the equivalent provision
provides that “[n]o person shall . . . circumvent a technological protection measure within the [definition of a technological protection measure].” Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s 41.1(1) (Can.).
418.
Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 546 (2005).
419.
See Popernik, supra note 414, at 698–700.
420.
See supra notes 316–25 and accompanying text.
421.
See, e.g., Noah J. Wald, Don’t Circumvent My Dongle! Misinterpretation of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act Threatens Digital Security Technology, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 325,
351–53 (2011) (criticizing the court’s conflation of the two issues in MGP UPS Sys., Inc., v. GE
Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2010)). Though some US courts have held that a
TPM must protect a copy-right in line with the World Copyright Treaty, which calls for protection
of measures that are used “in connection with the exercise of [authors’] rights under this Treaty or
the Berne Convention,” the DMCA prohibits circumvention of a TPM that “effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title.” WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 11, opened for signature
Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121 (entered into force Mar. 6, 2002); 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). The difference in language is held to imply that the
prohibition under the DMCA does not relate to the infringement of an underlying copyright. See
Wald, supra, at 338–39. But see Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d
1023, 1038 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that the DMCA applies to TPMs protected under copyright
law).
422.
See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 673, 734–77 (2000) (drawing out the unintended consequences of the DMCA’s “trafficking ban”); Carys J. Craig, Digital Locks and the Fate of Fair Dealing in Canada: In
Pursuit of “Prescriptive Parallelism”, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 503, 510–12 (2010) (noting the
clash between TPMs and Canada’s doctrine of “fair dealing”).
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is the end user’s “right to gain access.”423 Being originators and users of
data, particularly machine and technical data controlled through
TPMs, data originators ought to be recognized as bearers of a new right
of access to such data.424 The various “right to repair” initiatives that
are intended to allow technology users access to diagnostic and repair
data ought to be expanded to enable them to access other datasets of
which they are the originators.425
The basis for this recognition arises from the conceptualization
of copyright as an access-right, the grant of which entails the obligation
to secure access.426 In such a conceptualization, the data originator’s
right to access data is required, first, to counterbalance the
access-right, thereby fulfilling “[the] proper balance between protection
and access.”427 This addresses the goal of copyright law—affirmed by
Canada’s Supreme Court—of promoting the “progress of science and
useful arts,” as accepted in the United States.428 Given that copyright
exceptions are often overridden through contracts—for example,
exemptions granted by the Library of Congress to circumvent TPMs for
repair429—a legal framework is required that will entitle technology
users to access data through mandatory rules. Such rules should be
structured in a way that overrides any contractual clause to the
contrary. Second, users’ right to access machine and technical data,
which are often locked under proprietary software and controlled
through TPMs, is justified because technology users are the very source
of such data. Given that technical and machine data are raw data and
therefore do not attract copyright in most circumstances, there is no
justification for TPs to exclusively “own” these data through an accessright and enjoy exclusive benefits.

423.
See Marcella Favale, The Right of Access in Digital Copyright: Right of the Owner or
Right of the User, 15 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 1, 1–2, 20 n.62 (2012).
424.
For a similar argument, see Ian R. Kerr et al., supra note 314, at 47–49, 78 (arguing
that TPMs should be “counter-balanced by a newly introduced access-to-a-work right”).
425.
See supra notes 322–25 and accompanying text.
426.
For a conceptualization of copyright as an access right, see Christophe Geiger,
Copyright as an Access Right: Securing Cultural Participation Through the Protection of
Creators’ Interests, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE COPYRIGHT? 73, 79–80 (Rebecca Giblin &
Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2017).
427.
Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers v. Bell Can., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 326,
para. 11 (Can.).
428.
For a brief discussion on how the Progress Clause confers cultural benefits to society
(and not solely rights to creators), see Geiger, supra note 427, at 83, and Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 135 (1993)
(arguing that “access to knowledge might be a fundamental civil right”).
429.
See LUCIE M.C.R. GUIBAULT, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND CONTRACTS: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE CONTRACTUAL OVERRIDABILITY OF LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT 243 (2002).
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE INQUIRY
There is significant enthusiasm surrounding the big data
phenomenon given its potential to realize gains by applying precision
technologies that combine advanced technologies (for example, IoT)
with AI-based data analytics. However, there is some concern that
these gains might not be fairly distributed across users, TPs, data
intermediaries, and data platforms. The prevailing legal regime enables
actors in the upper echelon of the user data ecosystem to retain
exclusive and de facto control over access to various forms of user
data.430 A sui generis law inspired by copyright addresses the
distributional concerns associated with the different applications of big
data, such as in agriculture, by empowering technology users to
appropriate a fair share of the gains of digital technologies through
access to and control over data.
This Article has explored the various legal regimes relevant to
accessing and controlling user data in an evolving digital landscape. It
has demonstrated the inadequacy of current law and existing
mechanisms for ensuring technology users’ access to and control over
data. It has also identified trends in which TPs, data intermediaries,
and data platforms exercise ownership and control of user data to the
prejudice of data originators, such as farmers. Without legislation that
clarifies ownership and control through the equitable governance of
user data, these trends risk widening the inequality gap and may result
in the loss of technology users’ autonomy.
The potential of the big data phenomenon could be realized
through a data-governance mechanism that encourages users to share
data with technology providers through a relationship of trust and
transparency. This mechanism recognizes the need for originators to
have clarity regarding access to and control of their data while
simultaneously enabling data integration to provide actionable and
usable knowledge across the user data ecosystem. While the exchange
of data for such uses, as actionable on-farm and off-farm decisions, is
facilitated through proper data sharing, data originators such as
farmers need assurances as to who will have access to the data and how
it will be used. This consequently guarantees that the benefits of access
to and use of data are shared. This Article has argued that an ownership
framework for data access and control under copyright consolidates the
power of data collectors, processors, and aggregators. The prevailing
mechanism of data access and control through contracts also has the
same effect.
430.

See, e.g., discussion supra Section V.A.
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Given that contractual entitlements to data are often reinforced
and maintained through legal and technical forms of control under
copyright, this Article proposes that the appropriate protection of
farmers’ access to and control over data can be accomplished through
sui generis legislation modeled on copyright law. Copyright law
provides an appropriate normative basis for recognizing data
originators’ privacy interest regarding user data in its recognition of
authors’ claims to their work, where this work has a confidential and
private nature and is revelatory of the author’s identity.
This Article substantiates the need for access and control over
user data, to a large extent, based on an example of agricultural data.
Given the multidimensional and pervasive application of big data
technologies across diverse sectors, an outstanding issue remains to be
explored. That issue is whether the initiatives and mechanisms for
ensuring access to and control over technology users’ data (i) adopt a
sector-specific approach that focuses on context-specific areas to which
datafication brings unique challenges, or (ii) treat the users’ data as
part of the interconnected domain of the economy.
In recent discourse, the question of access to and control over
data is seen as part of a broader inquiry into the new political economy
trend, described in such expressions as the “data-driven economy,”431
“informational capitalism,”432 and “surveillance capitalism.”433 In these
settings, data constitutes the essential capital asset of the global
economy. However, agricultural data comprises a unique data category
that warrants consideration of a type different from, for example, social
media users’ data about which recent data-governance proposals have
proliferated.434 Unlike most other data categories, agricultural data is
actively utilized in farmers’ day-to-day activities, such as in the
planning of farm tasks, farm monitoring, events management,
automation of farm services, and forecasting of agricultural
production.435 Farmers require access to data in their role as decision431.
See Tilman Becker, Edward Curry, Anja Jentzsch & Walter Palmetshofer, New
Horizons for a Data-Driven Economy: Roadmaps and Action Plans for Technology, Businesses, Policy, and Society, in NEW HORIZONS FOR A DATA-DRIVEN ECONOMY: A ROADMAP FOR USAGE AND
EXPLOITATION OF BIG DATA IN EUROPE 277, 278 (José María Cavanillas, Edward Curry & Wolfgang Wahlster eds., 2016).
432.
COHEN, supra note 155, at 89.
433.
See, e.g., SHOSHANA ZUBOFF: THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR
A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 52–54 (2019) (assessing the wide-ranging impact of the technological revolution on human liberties).
434.
See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 130, at 15–16; Haupt, supra note 136, at 40; infra text
accompanying notes 436–39.
435.
See supra Part III and text accompanying notes 77–80. In some cases, social media
data may be used by social media stars who make their living off their posts. See Emily D. Hund,
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makers on their farms.436 In addition to using data in the operation,
management, and structure of farms, farmers utilize agricultural data
to participate in the agricultural value chain, including in the
marketing of their products.437 Moreover, the harm that disclosure of
agricultural data to third parties can cause farmers goes beyond
interests that privacy torts traditionally compensate—such as those
related to autonomy and dignity—by including economic harms. In the
US Poultry industry case mentioned above, for example, Agri Stat’s
disclosure of agricultural data to third parties resulted in lower wages
for farmers and increased prices.438
Thus, agricultural data has unique significance as an economic
good. In this context, insofar as agricultural data is closely interlinked
with a farmer’s land, such as agronomic data collected using AI sensors,
it would seem reasonable that the property interest in the land extends
to the data. Even in such scenarios, the data would be a subject of
property interest independent of the land. However, proposals to
recognize data as property in this manner have faced criticism because
of the limits of property rules in accommodating data ownership.439 In
this connection between data and property, it is necessary to inquire
whether the instrumentalization of copyright in the manner proposed
in this Article forms part of the so-called “new” materialist movement

The Influencer Industry: Constructing and Commodifying Authenticity on Social Media 60 (2019)
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (ScholarlyCommons). Such stars frequently utilize this data to make decisions about their posts. Id. at 62–63. To this extent, the analysis about
access to agricultural data may apply to social media and platform data. Cf. Balkin, supra note
129, at 12 (identifying informational asymmetries between social media platforms and consumers).
436.
See KEITH COBLE, TERRY GRIFFIN, MARY AHEARN, SHANNON FERRELL, JONATHAN
MCFADDEN, STEVE SONKA & JOHN FULTON, COUNCIL ON FOOD, AGRIC. & RES. ECON., ADVANCING
U.S. AGRICULTURAL COMPETITIVENESS WITH BIG DATA AND AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC MARKET INFORMATION, ANALYSIS, AND RESEARCH 7 (2016), https://www.mssoy.org/uploads/files/big-datacfare-nov-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LFU-KH3H].
437.
See Wolfert et al., supra note 271, at 74.
438.
See supra notes 109–16 and accompanying text; Leah Douglas & Christopher Leonard,
Is the US Chicken Industry Cheating Its Farmers?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2019, 12:21 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/aug/03/is-the-us-chicken-industry-cheating-itsfarmers [https://perma.cc/M4XY-W9WC].
439.
See Jorge L. Contreras, The False Promise of Health Data Ownership, 94 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 624, 660–61 (2019) (criticizing property ownership of data in the context of health care as
creating prohibitive costs and administrative complexities); Peter K. Yu, Data Producer’s Right
and the Protection of Machine-Generated Data, 93 TUL. L. REV. 859, 926 (2018) (critiquing the EU’s
proposed “data producer’s right” for generating complications in the law and policy arena);
HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 307, at 2 (arguing that the introduction of the data producer’s right
would “contravene fundamental freedoms” established by the European Convention on Human
Rights); Ignacio Cofone, Beyond Data Ownership, 43 CARDOZO L. REV. 501, 539–40 (2021); Jessica
Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1301 (2000).
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in intellectual property.440 This movement seeks to highlight “the
qualities and characteristics originating from non-human actors [sic]
such that, ‘the scope of original expression beyond that which originates
with a human contributor, might result in an expanded incidence of
authorship.’”441 If so, the analysis in this Article in the context of
agricultural data has implications for other areas, for example, areas in
which datafication of the agricultural land might be seen as an
equivalent to the “dematerialization” of genetic resources through
digital sequence information technologies.442 In short, the multifaceted
nature of big data’s applications draws convergences and
interconnections between different norms and regimes concerning
access to and control over data, which ought to be further explored to
properly reconcile conflicting interests of individuals, social groups,
companies, and countries.

440.
Dan L. Burk, Copyright and the New Materialism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ACCESS TO IM/MATERIAL GOODS 61 (Jessica C. Lai & Antoinette Maget Dominicé eds., 2016).
441.
Id.
442.
Cf. Julie E. Cohen, Property and the Construction of the Information Economy: A
Neo-Polanyian Ontology, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION 338
(Leah A. Lievrouw & Brian D. Loader eds., 2021) (observing that profit extraction in the
information economy requires the reconstruction of land as “dematerialized” and
“informationalized” data). In this context, “dematerialization” refers to the separation of data
associated with a genetic resource from its physical substrate, usually in the form of digital
sequence information (DSI). See Mark Lycett, ‘Datafication’: Making Sense of (Big) Data in a
Complex World, 22 EUR. J. INFO. SYS. 381, 382 (2013); see also Executive Secretary of the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Digital Sequence Information on Genetic Resources:
Concept, Scope and Current Use, at 2, U.N. Doc. CBD/DSI/AHTEG/2020/1/3 (Mar. 20, 2020)
(illustrating further the scope of DSI).

